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Abstract
For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider
iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper
applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone
potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under
some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to
incomplete information (Kajii and Morris, Econometrica 65 (1997))
and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynam-
ics for a small friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic
Theory 65 (1995)). Several simple sufficient conditions under which
a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided. Journal of
Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.
Keywords: equilibrium selection; robustness; incomplete infor-
mation; perfect foresight dynamics; iteration; monotone potential; p-
dominance.
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1 Introduction
Economic modeling, by its nature, is based on simplified assumptions that
schematize a given economic phenomenon. One way of assessing the role
of the assumptions postulated is to compare the model with its “perturbed
variants” based on slightly weakened assumptions. It is now well known
in game theory that outcomes of a game may dramatically change when
we allow for small departures from a given assumption (one may think of
departure from the common knowledge assumption as demonstrated, among
others, by Rubinstein (1989) or Carlsson and van Damme (1993)).1 Let us
say that an equilibrium is robust with respect to a given assumption if it is
still an equilibrium when this assumption is slightly weakened.
The lack of robustness of some Nash equilibria has led game theorists
to consider criteria that guarantee robustness. In bold strokes, two types
of methods have proved to be powerful in identifying equilibria that are
robust in various aspects: namely, the potential method (due to Monderer
and Shapley (1996); see also Blume (1993), Hofbauer and Sorger (1999,
2002), Ui (2001)) and the risk-dominance method (due to Harsanyi and
Selten (1988); see also Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993),
Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995), and Kajii
and Morris (1997)). These criteria, however, are very demanding and such
concepts fail to exist in many games. In this paper, we introduce a notion
of iterative construction that enables us to enlarge the class of games where
these approaches apply and hence to extend the existing sufficient conditions
for equilibria to be robust.
Specifically, we consider two robustness tests. The first one is the so-
called “robustness to incomplete information” test as originally defined by
Kajii and Morris (1997). To motivate this approach, consider an analyst
who plans to model some strategic situation by a particular complete infor-
mation game. This analyst should be aware that his prediction might be (in
some games) highly dependent on the assumption of complete information.
Hence, if it is guaranteed that the analyst’s prediction based on the com-
plete information game is not qualitatively different from some equilibrium
of the real incomplete information game being played, then he is justified
in choosing the simplified assumption of complete information. To be more
precise, robustness to incomplete information is defined as follows. A (pure)
Nash equilibrium a∗ of a complete information game g is robust to incom-
1Sensitivity to simplified assumptions has also been discussed in many economic appli-
cations. For instance, Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) respec-
tively consider how the predictions of standard models on currency crises and on bank
runs which rely on the existence of multiple self-fulfilling beliefs are modified when allow-
ing for slight departure from the complete information assumption. In a series of papers,
Matsuyama (1991, 1992a, 1992b) departs from the perfect reversibility assumption on ac-
tion revisions such as career choice decisions and underlines its consequences in models of
sectoral adjustment and economic development.
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plete information if every “nearby” incomplete information elaboration of
g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that generates an (ex-ante) distribution
over actions assigning a weight close to one to a∗. “Nearby” incomplete in-
formation elaborations are incomplete information games such that the sets
of players and actions are the same as in the complete information game g,
and with high probability, each player knows that his payoffs are the same
as in g. Thus, payoffs of the incomplete information elaboration are allowed
to be very different of g with very low probability.
The second robustness test we consider is the one introduced by Matsui
and Matsuyama (1995), namely, the perfect foresight dynamics approach.
To motivate this approach, assume that an analyst considers a one-shot com-
plete information game to predict the long-run outcome of a given repeated
interaction. Consider a Nash equilibrium of this game and embed the game
in a dynamic game with a large society of agents. If there is no link between
time periods, then, regardless of the initial action distribution of the society,
the Nash equilibrium is the limit of some equilibrium path in this dynamic
game. But what if we slightly depart from such a simplified assumption
and assume that there exists a small amount of irreversibility or friction in
action revisions? If in this modified dynamic game, the Nash equilibrium
is always the limit of an equilibrium path regardless of the initial action
distribution, then the analyst can ignore the subtle complications induced
by intertemporal effects through irreversibility. To be more precise, we con-
sider a large society with continua of agents (one for each player position of
g), in which a one-shot game g is played repeatedly in a random matching
fashion. There is friction in action revisions: each agent cannot change his
action at every point in time. Action revision opportunities follow inde-
pendent Poisson processes. Agents, when given a revision opportunity, take
actions that maximize their expected discounted payoffs. The degree of fric-
tion is then measured by the discounted average duration of a commitment.
A perfect foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along which
each revising agent takes a best response to the future course of play. A
Nash equilibrium a∗ is globally accessible if for any initial action distribu-
tion, there exists a perfect foresight path that converges to a∗; a∗ is linearly
absorbing if the feasible path converging linearly to a∗ is the unique perfect
foresight path from each initial action distribution in a neighborhood of a∗.
If a Nash equilibrium that is globally accessible is also absorbing, then it is
the unique globally accessible equilibrium.
It has been known that even a strict Nash equilibrium may fail to be ro-
bust in each sense above. In 2×2 coordination games, for instance, while the
risk-dominant equilibrium is robust in the above senses, the risk-dominated
equilibrium is not: the risk-dominated equilibrium is never played in any
Bayesian Nash equilibrium under some incomplete information structures
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(Rubinstein (1989), Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995))2 and it is never played
along any equilibrium path for some initial action distributions (Matsui and
Matsuyama (1995)). That is, even strict Nash equilibria which are often
considered as being immune against most perturbations (see Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986)) can be very sensitive to slight departure from some simpli-
fied assumptions.
In finding sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to be robust in each
sense above, the two concepts of potential maximizer and p-dominance (the
latter is a generalization of risk-dominance) have proved to be powerful.
Kajii and Morris (1997) show that if the complete information game has
a p-dominant equilibrium with low p, then it is robust to incomplete in-
formation,3 while Ui (2001) shows that in potential games, the potential
maximizer is robust to incomplete information. For perfect foresight dy-
namics, Hofbauer and Sorger (1999, 2002) show that a potential maximizer
is stable for any small degree of friction, while the p-dominance condition
is studied by Oyama (2002) (in a single population setting).4 Furthermore,
Morris and Ui (2005) introduce a generalization of potential and establishes
the robustness of generalized potential maximizer to incomplete informa-
tion. Oyama, Takahashi, and Hofbauer (2008, OTH henceforth) consider
the stability of monotone potential maximizer (a special case of general-
ized potential maximizer) under the perfect foresight dynamics. The class
of games with a monotone potential maximizer contains games with a p-
dominant equilibrium with a low p, and therefore the results on general-
ized/monotone potential maximizer unify the potential maximizer and the
p-dominance conditions.
This paper applies an iterative construction to potential and p-dominance
methods to generate new sufficient conditions that are obtained by iterat-
ing the existing conditions above. Considering monotone potential, which
unifies the two methods, we introduce iterated monotone potential maxi-
mizer (iterated MP-maximizer). Roughly speaking, our iterative procedure
to build this concept can be described as follows. An action profile a∗ is said
to be an iterated MP-maximizer if there exists a sequence of subsets of ac-
tion profiles S0 ⊃ S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm = {a∗} such that for all k = 1, · · · ,m, Sk
is an MP-maximizer set in the game restricted to Sk−1, where S0 is the set
of all action profiles. We show that under certain monotonicity conditions,
an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information and globally
accessible and linearly absorbing for a small friction. This is proved by ex-
2Kajii and Morris (1997) also provide a three-player three-action game where a unique
Nash equilibrium, which is strict, is not robust to incomplete information.
3Tercieux (2006b) proves a set-valued extension of this result.
4Kojima (2006) considers another generalization of risk-dominance and establishes the
stability result in a multiple population setting. Kim (1996) reports a similar result
for binary games with many identical players. Tercieux (2006a) considers a set-valued
extension of the p-dominance condition.
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ploiting the similarity between the mathematical structures of incomplete
information elaborations and perfect foresight dynamics, which may be of
independent interest.5
Given our main results above, it remains to confirm their relevance in
conceptual and practical aspects. While it is powerful enough to allow us,
through iteration, to prove our results, the original MP-maximizer itself
is an abstract concept so that no simple characterization has been known
for a game to have an MP-maximizer (unless the game is a simple one
such as a 2 × 2 game), and therefore it is in general a difficult task to find
an MP-maximizer, and hence an iterated MP-maximizer, in a given game.
This fact also makes it difficult to examine the additional bite iterated MP-
maximizer has over MP-maximizer. We thus instead offer simpler concepts
that remain easier to manipulate in identifying a robust Nash equilibrium.
For these simpler concepts, we show by means of examples that the iterative
construction considered in this paper indeed has an additional bite for both
the potential and the p-dominance methods. We also provide a simple
application to demonstrate the practical use of our iterative construction in
an economic context.
First, we consider iteration of p-dominance by discussing the concept
of iterated p-dominant equilibrium defined by Tercieux (2006a). We prove
that if a game has an iterated p-dominant equilibrium with low p, then this
equilibrium is actually an iterated MP-maximizer and the relevant mono-
tonicity conditions for our robustness results to hold are satisfied. It is also
shown that iterated p-dominance is strictly more general than p-dominance.
Second, as a specific form of MP-maximizer, we consider local potential max-
imizer (LP-maximizer) as introduced by Morris and Ui (2005). We define
iterated LP-maximizer and verify that, in games with marginal diminishing
returns, an iterated LP-maximizer is an iterated MP-maximizer. In con-
trast with MP-maximizers, Morris and Ui (2005) are able to give a simple
characterization for LP-maximizers, which enables us to show that, for this
specific form of MP-maximizers, our iterative construction leads to a strictly
more general concept: we provide an example of a simple game that has an
iterated LP-maximizer but no LP-maximizer. Restricting our attention to
specific classes of games, we further give several other tools which are much
easier to manipulate in finding robust Nash equilibria. In particular, for
two-player supermodular coordination games, we introduce the concept of
iterated risk-dominance which is based on (a generalization of) the pairwise
risk-dominance concept considered by Kandori and Rob (1998) and thus
relies only on local properties of the payoff structure.
Finally, we discuss a simple application to demonstrate that our itera-
5Takahashi (2008) reports a formal correspondence between perfect foresight dynamics
and global games (with a certain class of noise structures) for games with linear payoff
functions.
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tive procedures can be applied to identify a robust prediction in an economic
situation. Specifically, we consider a simple game of technology adoption in-
spired by Kandori and Rob (1998), which under certain assumptions falls
into the class of supermodular coordination games. We identify an itera-
tively risk-dominant technology in this game, which in fact constitutes an
iterated MP-maximizer and thus provides us with a robust prediction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of
iterated MP-maximizer as well as other related concepts. Section 3 consid-
ers the informational robustness of iterated MP-maximizer, while Section 4
considers the stability of iterated MP-maximizer under the perfect foresight
dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
2 Iterated Monotone Potential Maximizer
2.1 Underlying Game
Throughout our analysis, we fix the set of players, I = {1, 2, · · · , N}, and
the linearly ordered set of actions, Ai = {0, 1, . . . , ni}, for each player i ∈
I. We denote
∏
i∈I Ai by A and
∏
j 6=iAj by A−i. A one-shot complete
information game is specified by, and identified with, a profile of payoff
functions, g = (gi)i∈I , where gi : A → R is the payoff function for player i.
For S = S1×· · ·×SN where Si ⊂ Ai, gi|S denotes the restriction of gi to S.
We identify g|S = (gi|S)i∈I with the restricted game with the sets of actions
Si.
For any nonempty, at most countable set S, we denote by ∆(S) the set of
all probability distributions on S. We sometimes identify each action in Ai
with the element of ∆(Ai) that assigns one to the corresponding coordinate.
For xi, yi ∈ ∆(Ai), we write xi - yi if
ni∑
k=h
xik ≤
ni∑
k=h
yik
for all h ∈ Ai. We write x - y for x, y ∈
∏
i∆(Ai) if xi - yi for all i ∈ I,
and x−i - y−i for x−i, y−i ∈
∏
j 6=i∆(Aj) if xj - yj for all j 6= i. For
pii, pi
′
i ∈ ∆(A−i), we write pii - pi′i if∑
a−i∈S−i
pii(a−i) ≤
∑
a−i∈S−i
pi′i(a−i)
for any increasing subset S−i ⊂ A−i.6 The game g is said to be supermodular
if whenever h < k, the difference gi(k, a−i) − gi(h, a−i) is nondecreasing in
a−i ∈ A−i, i.e., if a−i ≤ b−i, then
gi(k, a−i)− gi(h, a−i) ≤ gi(k, b−i)− gi(h, b−i).
6S−i ⊂ A−i is said to be increasing if a−i ∈ S−i and a−i ≤ b−i imply b−i ∈ S−i.
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It is well known that this property extends to ∆(A−i): if h < k and pii - pi′i,
then
gi(k, pii)− gi(h, pii) ≤ gi(k, pi′i)− gi(h, pi′i).
We endow
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai), ∆(A), and ∆(A−i), i ∈ I, with the sup (or max)
norm: |x| = maxi∈I maxh∈Ai xih for x ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai), |pi| = maxa∈A pi(a)
for pi ∈ ∆(A), and |pii| = maxa−i∈A−i pii(a−i) for pii ∈ ∆(A−i). For ε > 0,
denote Bε(x) = {x′ ∈
∏
i∆(Ai) | |x′ − x| < ε} for x ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai), Bε(pi) =
{pi′ ∈ ∆(A) | |pi′ − pi| < ε} for pi ∈ ∆(A), and Bε(pii) = {pi′i ∈ ∆(A−i) |
|pi′i − pii| < ε} for pii ∈ ∆(A−i). Write Bε(F ) =
⋃
pi∈F Bε(pi) for F ⊂ ∆(A)
and Bε(F−i) =
⋃
pii∈F−i Bε(pii) for F−i ⊂ ∆(A−i).
Let f be a function from A to R. With abuse of notion, f(ai, ·) are
extended to
∏
j 6=i∆(Aj) and ∆(A−i), and f(·) to
∏
j∈I ∆(Aj) and ∆(A) in
the usual way. For Si ⊂ Ai, let
br if (x−i|Si) = argmax{f(h, x−i) | h ∈ Si}
for x−i ∈
∏
j 6=i∆(Aj), and
br if (pii|Si) = argmax{f(h, pii) | h ∈ Si}
for pii ∈ ∆(A−i). We also denote br if (x−i) = br if (x−i|Ai) and br if (pii) =
br if (pii|Ai).
Let S∗i be a nonempty subset of Ai for each i ∈ I, and S∗ =
∏
i∈I S
∗
i .
We say that S∗ is a best response set of g if for all i ∈ I, br igi(pii)∩S∗i 6= ∅ for
all pii ∈ ∆(S−i) and that S∗ is a strict best response set of g if for all i ∈ I,
br igi(pii) ⊂ S∗i for all pii ∈ ∆(S−i). An action profile a∗ ∈ A is a (strict) Nash
equilibrium of g if {a∗} is a (strict) best response set of g.
2.2 Iterated MP-Maximizer
In this subsection, we define our main concept of iterated monotone potential
maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer, in short). In the sequel, we denote
[ai, ai] = {h ∈ Ai | ai ≤ h ≤ ai}, and for a = (ai)i∈I and a = (ai)i∈I ,
[a, a] =
∏
i∈I [ai, ai] and [a−i, a−i] =
∏
j 6=i[aj , aj ]. We say that S ⊂ A is an
order interval, or simply an interval, if S = [a, a] for some a, a ∈ A such that
ai ≤ ai for all i ∈ I, and denote Si = [ai, ai] and S−i = [a−i, a−i].
We employ a refinement of the MP-maximizer concept due to Morris
and Ui (2005).7
Definition 2.1. An interval S∗ ⊂ A is a strict MP-maximizer set of g if
there exists a function v : A → R such that S∗ = argmaxa∈A v(a), and for
all i ∈ I and all pii ∈ ∆(A−i),
min br iv(pii|[minAi,minS∗i ]) ≤ min br igi(pii|[minAi,maxS∗i ]), (2.1)
7This refinement has been introduced by OTH (2008, Definition 4.2) for action profiles
(singleton sets).
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and
max br iv(pii|[maxS∗i ,maxAi]) ≥ max br igi(pii|[minS∗i ,maxAi]). (2.2)
Such a function v is called a strict monotone potential function.
Now our concept of iterated strict MP-maximizer is obtained by iteration
of strict MP-maximizer.
Definition 2.2. An interval S∗ ⊂ A is an iterated strict MP-maximizer set
of g if there exists a sequence of intervals S0, S1, . . . , Sm with A = S0 ⊃
S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm = S∗ such that Sk is a strict MP-maximizer set of g|Sk−1 for
each k = 1, . . . ,m.
An action profile a∗ ∈ A is an iterated strict MP-maximizer of g if {a∗}
is an iterated strict MP-maximizer set of g.
For supermodular games, an iterated strict MP-maximizer is unique if
it exists, due to Theorems 4.1 and 4.7 given in Section 4.
We also introduce a weaker, but more complicated, version of iterated
MP-maximizer, which is sufficient to obtain the robustness to incomplete
information and the stability under perfect foresight dynamics.
Definition 2.3. Let S∗ and S be intervals such that S∗ ⊂ S ⊂ A. S∗ is an
MP-maximizer set of g relative to S if there exist a function v : A→ R and
a real number η > 0 such that S∗ = argmaxa∈A v(a), and for all i ∈ I and
all pii ∈ Bη(∆(S−i)),
min br iv(pii|[minSi,minS∗i ]) ≤ max br igi(pii|[minSi,maxS∗i ]), (2.3)
and
max br iv(pii|[maxS∗i ,maxSi]) ≥ min br igi(pii|[minS∗i ,maxSi]). (2.4)
Such a function v is called amonotone potential function relative to Bη(∆(S)).
Notice the ‘max’ and the ‘min’ in the right hand sides of (2.3) and (2.4),
respectively (cf. those of (2.1) and (2.2)). Notice also that v is defined on
the whole set A and that (2.3) and (2.4) must be satisfied also for beliefs
pii that assign small probability (less than η) to actions outside S−i, which
is an indispensable requirement for the informational robustness and the
stability; see Example 2.1.
Definition 2.4. An interval S∗ ⊂ A is an iterated MP-maximizer set of g
if there exists a sequence of intervals S0, S1, . . . , Sm with A = S0 ⊃ S1 ⊃
· · · ⊃ Sm = S∗ such that Sk is an MP-maximizer set relative to Sk−1 for
each k = 1, . . . ,m.
An action profile a∗ ∈ A is an iterated MP-maximizer of g if {a∗} is an
iterated MP-maximizer set of g.
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For an iterated (strict) MP-maximizer set S∗, the sequence S0, S1, . . . , Sm
in the definition will be called associated intervals of S∗.
Remark 2.1. In Definition 2.3, let Pi = {S∗i } ∪ {{ai} | ai /∈ S∗i } and P =
{∏i∈I Xi | Xi ∈ Pi for i ∈ I}. If v is P-measurable, then “[minSi,minS∗i ]”
in the left hand side of (2.1) and (2.3) and “[maxS∗i ,maxSi]” in the left
hand side of (2.2) and (2.4) can be replaced with “[minSi,maxS∗i ]” and
“[minS∗i ,maxSi]”, respectively. If S
∗ is an MP-maximizer set relative to A
with v being P-measurable, then it is an MP-maximizer (with respect to P)
in the sense of Morris and Ui (2005, Definition 8).
Here we show that iterated strict MP-maximizer is actually a refinement
of iterated MP-maximizer.
Proposition 2.1. An iterated strict MP-maximizer set is an iterated MP-
maximizer set.
It is sufficient to show the following.
Lemma 2.2. Let S∗ and S be intervals such that S∗ ⊂ S ⊂ A. If S∗ is
a strict MP-maximizer set of g|S with a strict monotone potential function
v : S → R, then there exist a function v˜ : A → R and a real number η > 0
such that S∗ = argmaxa∈A v˜(a), and (2.1) and (2.2) with A = S hold for
all i ∈ I and all pii ∈ Bη(∆(S−i)).
Moreover, if v|S is supermodular, then v˜ can be taken so that v˜|A is
supermodular.
We call such a function v˜ a strict monotone potential function relative
to Bη(∆(S)).
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we report a useful fact for reference.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose that g has an iterated MP-maximizer S∗ with A =
S0 ⊃ S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm = S∗ and (vk)mk=1. Then, there exists η > 0 such that
for all k = 1, . . . ,m and for all i ∈ I and all pii ∈ Bη(∆(Sk−i)),
br igi(pii) ∩ Ski 6= ∅.
Proof. Note first that for all ` = 1, . . . , k, S` = argmaxa∈S`−1 v`(a), and
therefore we can take ε` > 0 such that for all i ∈ I and all pii ∈ Bε`(∆(S`−i)),
br iv`(pii|[minS`−1i ,minS`i ]) = minS`i ,
br iv`(pii|[maxS`i ,maxS`−1i ]) = maxS`i
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due to the continuity of v`(h, pii) in pii. By definition, for all ` = 1, . . . , k,
there exists η` > 0 such that for all i ∈ I and all pii ∈ Bη`(∆(S`−i)),
max br igi(pii|[minS`−1i ,maxS`i ]) ≥ min br iv`(pii|[minS`−1i ,minS`i ]),
min br igi(pii|[minS`i ,maxS`−1i ]) ≤ max br iv`(pii|[maxS`i ,maxS`−1i ]).
Setting η = min` ε` ∧ min` η`, we have that for all ` = 1, . . . , k and for all
i ∈ I and all pii ∈ Bη(∆(Sk−i)) (⊂ Bη(∆(S`−i))),
max br igi(pii|[minS`−1i ,maxS`−1i ]) ≥ minS`i ,
min br igi(pii|[minS`−1i ,maxS`−1i ]) ≤ maxS`i ,
and therefore,
br igi(pii|S`−1i ) ∩ S`i 6= ∅.
An induction argument thus proves that
br igi(pii) ∩ Ski 6= ∅
for all i ∈ I and all pii ∈ Bη(∆(Sk−i)), as claimed.
Example 2.1. Consider the following 2× 3 supermodular game:
0 1 2
0 1, 0 1, 1 0, 0
1 0, 0 1, 1 1, 0
In this game, both (0, 1) and (1, 1) were iterated MP-maximizers if η in
Definition 2.3 were allowed to be set to zero. But one can verify that none
of them is robust to incomplete information or globally accessible under
perfect foresight dynamics. Hence, this example shows that the requirement
(in the definition of iterated MP-maximizer) that the conditions be satisfied
for all pii ∈ Bη(∆(Sk−1)) (where η > 0) is indispensable for robustness to
incomplete information and stability under perfect foresight dynamics.
2.3 Iterated LP-Maximizer
Generally, finding an MP-maximizer or iterated MP-maximizer is a difficult
task, since no full characterization (i.e., necessary and sufficient condition)
has been known for a game to have an MP-maximizer and hence an it-
erated MP-maximizer (unless the game is a simple game such as a 2 × 2
game). In this subsection, we focus on a specific form of MP-maximizer,
local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer) introduced by Morris (1999) and
Morris and Ui (2005), for which several rather simple characterizations are
available (e.g., Morris and Ui (2005) and Okada and Tercieux (2008)), and
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introduce the iterative notion of LP-maximizer as a specific form of iterated
MP-maximizer. In Subsection 2.6, we will show, by means of an exam-
ple, that the iterated LP-maximizer is strictly more general than the simple
LP-maximizer, thereby demonstrating that, for such MP-maximizers, the
iterative construction we offer in the present paper does have a bite.
We review the definition of LP-maximizer by Morris and Ui (2005) and
then introduce its strict version which will in turn be applied for its iteration.
Definition 2.5. An interval S∗ ⊂ A is an LP-maximizer set of g if there
exists a function v : A→ R such that S∗ = argmaxa∈A v(a), and for all i ∈ I
and all ai < minS∗i ,
max
a′i∈a+i
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(a′i, a−i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(ai, a−i)
holds for all pii ∈ ∆(A−i) such that∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai + 1, a−i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai, a−i),
where a+i = {ai+1} if ai+1 < minS∗i and a+i = S∗i if ai+1 = minS∗i ; and
for all i ∈ I and all ai > maxS∗i ,
max
a′i∈a−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(a′i, a−i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(ai, a−i)
holds for all pii ∈ ∆(A−i) such that∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai − 1, a−i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai, a−i),
where a−i = {ai − 1} if ai − 1 > maxS∗i and a−i = S∗i if ai − 1 = maxS∗i .
Such a function v is called a local potential function.
The strict version of LP-maximizer is defined as follows, where the weak
inequalities in the previous definition are replaced with strict ones.8
Definition 2.6. An interval S∗ ⊂ A is a strict LP-maximizer set of g if
there exists a function v : A → R such that S∗ = argmaxa∈A v(a), and for
all i ∈ I and all ai < minS∗i ,
max
a′i∈a+i
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(a′i, a−i) >
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(ai, a−i)
8For action profiles (singleton sets), our definition is equivalent to that of OTH (2008,
Definition 4.4(ii)).
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holds for all pii ∈ ∆(A−i) such that∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai + 1, a−i) >
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai, a−i),
where a+i = {ai+1} if ai+1 < minS∗i and a+i = S∗i if ai+1 = minS∗i ; and
for all i ∈ I and all ai > maxS∗i ,
max
a′i∈a−i
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(a′i, a−i) >
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)gi(ai, a−i)
holds for all pii ∈ ∆(A−i) such that∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai − 1, a−i) >
∑
a−i∈A−i
pii(a−i)v(ai, a−i),
where a−i = {ai − 1} if ai − 1 > maxS∗i and a−i = S∗i if ai − 1 = maxS∗i .
Such a function v is called a strict local potential function.
Now we define the notion of iterated strict LP-maximizer in a similar
way as we defined iterated strict MP-maximizer.
Definition 2.7. An interval S∗ ⊂ A is an iterated strict LP-maximizer set
of g if there exists a sequence of intervals S0, S1, . . . , Sm with A = S0 ⊃
S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm = S∗ such that Sk is a strict LP-maximizer set of g|Sk−1 for
each k = 1, . . . ,m.
An action profile a∗ ∈ A is an iterated strict LP-maximizer of g if {a∗}
is an iterated strict LP-maximizer set of g.
The game g is said to have diminishing marginal returns if for all i ∈ I,
all h 6= minAi,maxAi, and all a−i ∈ A−i,
gi(h, a−i)− gi(h− 1, a−i) ≥ gi(h+ 1, a−i)− gi(h, a−i).
As in Morris and Ui (2005) or OTH (2008, Lemma 4.2), one can show that
if the game g or the local potential function v has diminishing marginal
returns, then a strict LP-maximizer is a strict MP-maximizer. Therefore,
in such games, an iterated strict LP-maximizer is always an iterated strict
MP-maximizer.
Proposition 2.4. If a∗ is an iterated strict LP-maximizer of g with associ-
ated intervals (Sk)mk=0 and local potential functions (v
k)mk=1 and if for each
k = 1, . . . ,m, g|Sk−1 or vk|Sk−1 has marginal diminishing returns, then a∗
is an iterated strict MP-maximizer of g with monotone potential functions
(vk)mk=1.
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2.4 Iterated p-Dominance
This subsection provides simple ways to find iterated monotone potentials
using iteration of p-dominance as considered in Tercieux (2006a).
Let p = (pi)i∈I ∈ [0, 1)N . Let us first review the definition of strict
p-dominant equilibrium due to Kajii and Morris (1997).
Definition 2.8. An action profile a∗ ∈ A is a strict p-dominant equilibrium
of g if for all i ∈ I,
{a∗i } = br igi(pii)
holds for all pii ∈ ∆(A−i) with pii(a∗−i) > pi.
Next we define strict p-best response set. This concept is a set-valued
extension of the strict p-dominance concept (see Tercieux (2006a, 2006b)).
The set S =
∏
i∈I Si (Si ⊂ Ai, i ∈ I) is a strict p-best response set if, when-
ever any player i believes with probability strictly greater than pi that the
other players will play actions in S−i, all of his best responses are contained
in Si.
Definition 2.9. Let S∗i be a nonempty subset of Ai for each i ∈ I, and
S∗ =
∏
i∈I S
∗
i . The set S
∗ is a strict p-best response set of g if for all i ∈ I,
br igi(pii) ⊂ S∗i
holds for all pii ∈ ∆(A−i) with pii(S∗−i) > pi.
Now with the two steps procedure that we used to define an iterated MP-
maximizer, we define iterated (strict) p-dominant equilibrium. Formally,
this can be stated as follows.
Definition 2.10. Let S∗i be a nonempty subset of Ai for each i ∈ I, and
S∗ =
∏
i∈I S
∗
i . The set S
∗ is an iterated strict p-best response set of g if
there exists a sequence S0, S1, . . . , Sm with A = S0 ⊃ S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm = S∗
such that Sk is a strict p-best response set in g|Sk−1 for each k = 1, . . . ,m.
An action profile a∗ ∈ A is an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium of
g if {a∗} is an iterated strict p-best response set of g.
For an iterated strict p-best response set S∗, the sequence S0, S1, . . . , Sm
in the definition will be called associated subsets of S∗.
We now prove a link between iterated p-dominant equilibrium and iter-
ated MP-maximizer.
Proposition 2.5. Let a∗ be an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium of g
with
∑
i∈I pi < 1, and A = S
0 ⊃ S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm = {a∗} associated subsets.
Then, there exists an order < on A such that Sk’s are intervals and a∗ is
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an iterated strict MP-maximizer with monotone potential functions (vk)mk=1
that are supermodular and of the form:
vk(a) =
{
1−∑i∈I pi if a ∈ Sk,
−∑i∈Ck(a) pi otherwise, (2.5)
where Ck(a) = {i ∈ I | ai ∈ Ski }.
To have vk’s be supermodular, re-order the actions so that for all i ∈ I,
for all k = 1, . . . ,m, and for all ai ∈ Ski , a′i ∈ Sk−1i \ Ski , a′i < ai. Note that
this implies that a∗ = maxA = maxS1 = · · ·maxSm. One can verify that
for all k, vk is supermodular with respect to the new order.
Now Proposition 2.5 follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. Let (Sk)mk=0 be intervals such that A = S
0 ⊃ S1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sm
and maxSk = maxA for all k = 1, . . . ,m. If for each k = 1, . . . ,m, Sk
is a strict pk-best response set in g|Sk−1 with
∑
i∈I p
k
i < 1, then S
m is an
iterated strict MP-maximizer set of g.
Proof. For each k = 1, . . . ,m, let vk be given as in (2.5) with pi = pki .
Consider any k = 1, . . . ,m and any i ∈ I. It is now sufficient to show
that vk is a strict monotone potential functions for Sk in g|Sk−1 . Denote
a`j = minS
`
j for each j ∈ I and ` = k − 1, k. We want to show that for all
pii ∈ ∆(Sk−1−i ),
min br ivk(pii|Sk−1i ) ≤ min br igi(pii|Sk−1i )
(note that br ivk(pii|Sk−1i ) = br ivk(pii|[ak−1i , aki ]) by construction).
Fix any pii ∈ ∆(Sk−1−i ). Observe that
vk(h, pii) =
∑
a−i∈Sk−1−i
pii(a−i)vk(h, a−i)
takes only two different values: one for h < aki and another for h ≥ aki .
Hence,
min br ivk(pii|Sk−1i ) ∈ {ak−1i , aki }.
It is sufficient to consider the case where min br ivk(pii|Sk−1i ) = aki . For such
pii ∈ (Sk−1−i ), we have
0 < vk(aki , pii)− vk(ak−1i , pii) =
∑
a−i∈Sk−i
pii(a−i)(1− pki )−
∑
a−i /∈Sk−i
pii(a−i)pki
=
∑
a−i∈Sk−i
pii(a−i)− pki ,
and thus pii(Sk−i) > p
k
i . Since S
k is a strict pk-best response set in
g|Sk−1 , br igi(pii|Sk−1i ) ⊂ Ski . Therefore, we have min br igi(pii|Sk−1i ) ≥ aki =
min br ivk(pii|Sk−1i ), completing the proof.
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In the case where g is supermodular, we have a simple characterization of
iterated p-dominant equilibrium by means of the notion of iterated pairwise
p-dominance.
Definition 2.11. An action profile a∗ ∈ A is an iterated pairwise strict
p-dominant equilibrium of g if there exists a sequence 0 = a0i ≤ a1i ≤ · · · ≤
ami = a
∗
i = a
m
i ≤ · · · ≤ a1i ≤ a0i = ni for each i ∈ I such that for all
k = 1, . . . ,m, ak is a strict p-dominant equilibrium in g|[ak−1,ak] and ak is a
strict p-dominant equilibrium in g|[ak,ak−1].
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that g is supermodular. If a∗ is an iterated
pairwise strict p-dominant equilibrium of g, then a∗ is an iterated strict
p-dominant equilibrium of g.
Hence, by Proposition 2.5, if a∗ is an iterated pairwise strict p-dominant
equilibrium of a supermodular game g with
∑
i∈I pi < 1, then a
∗ is an
iterated strict MP-maximizer of g.
The proof utilizes the following fact.
Lemma 2.8. Suppose that g is supermodular. Let S be an interval such that
maxS = maxA. If minS is a strict p-dominant equilibrium in g|[0,minS],
then S is a strict p-best response set of g.
Proof. Given S as above, denote ai = minSi for each i ∈ I. Take any
i ∈ I and any pii ∈ ∆(A−i) such that pii(S−i) > pi. We want to show that
br igi(pii) ⊂ Si. Define pi′i ∈ ∆(A−i) by
pi′i(a−i) =

pii(S−i) if a−i = a−i,
1− pii(S−i) if a−i = 0,
0 otherwise.
Since pi′i(ai) > pi, we have br
i
gi(pi
′
i|[0, ai]) = {ai} by the assumption that a is
a strict p-dominant equilibrium in g|[0,a], so that min br igi(pi′i) ≥ ai. On the
other hand, since pi′i - pii, we have min br igi(pi′i) ≤ min br igi(pii) due to the
supermodularity of g. It thus follows that min br igi(pii) ≥ ai, which implies
that br igi(pii) ⊂ Si.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Suppose that a∗ is an iterated pairwise p-dominant
equilibrium. It is sufficient to show that (a) for each k = 1, . . . ,m, [ak, a0] is
a strict p-best response set in g|[ak−1,a0], and (b) for each k = 1, . . . ,m,
[a∗, ak] is a strict p-best response set in g|[a∗,ak−1]. But, since ak is a
strict p-dominant equilibrium in g|[ak−1,ak], (a) follows from Lemma 2.8 with
A = [ak−1, a0] and S = [ak, a0]. One can similarly prove (b) by Lemma 2.8
(by reversing the order on actions).
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Remark 2.2. For supermodular games, it is simple to check whether ak is
a strict p-dominant equilibrium in g|[ak−1,ak] for some p with
∑
i∈I pi <
1. Indeed, it is necessary and sufficient to check that for each i ∈ I,
br igi(pii|[ak−1i , aki ]) = {aki } for pii ∈ ∆([ak−1−i , ak−i]) such that pii(ak−1−i ) = 1−pi
and pii(ak−i) = pi.
2.5 Iterated Risk-Dominance
In this subsection, we consider the class of two-player coordination games,
where there are two players with the same action set Ai = {0, 1, . . . , n} for
each i = 1, 2, and all the action profiles on the diagonal are strict Nash
equilibria, i.e., (h, k) is a strict Nash equilibrium if and only if h = k.
We provide a simpler way to find iterated strict MP-maximizers in two-
player supermodular coordination games. Let us first generalize the notion
of pairwise risk-dominance by Kandori and Rob (1998) to asymmetric two-
player games and then define our notion of iterated risk-dominance.
Definition 2.12. Let g be a two-player coordination game. We say that
(h, h) pairwise risk dominates (k, k) in g if(
g1(h, h)− g1(k, h)
)× (g2(h, h)− g2(k, h))
>
(
g1(k, k)− g1(h, k)
)× (g2(k, k)− g2(h, k)), (2.6)
and write (h, h) PRD (k, k).
Definition 2.13. Let g be a two-player coordination game. (h∗, h∗) is an
iterated risk-dominant equilibrium of g if
1. (h, h) PRD (h− 1, h− 1) for each h = 1, . . . , h∗, and
2. (h, h) PRD (h+ 1, h+ 1) for each h = h∗, . . . , n− 1.
Proposition 2.9. Suppose that g is a two-player supermodular coordination
game. If (h∗, h∗) is an iterated risk-dominant equilibrium of g, then it is an
iterated strict MP-maximizer of g.
Proof. Suppose that (h∗, h∗) is an iterated risk-dominant equilibrium. In
light of Lemma 2.6, it is sufficient to show that (a) for each h = 1, . . . , h∗,
[h, n]× [h, n] is a strict ph-best response set in g|[h−1,n]×[h−1,n] for some ph
such that ph1 + p
h
2 < 1, and (b) for each k = h
∗, . . . , n − 1, [h∗, k] × [h∗, k]
is a strict pk-best response set in g|[h∗,k+1]×[h∗,k+1] for some pk such that
pk1 + p
k
2 < 1. We only show (a).
Consider any h = 1, . . . , h∗, and let
phi =
gi(h− 1, h− 1)− gi(h, h− 1)
gi(h, h)− gi(h− 1, h) + gi(h− 1, h− 1)− gi(h, h− 1) > 0
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and ph = (ph1 , p
h
2). Verify that p
h
1+p
h
2 < 1 due to the condition (2.6) and that
(h, h) is a strict ph-dominant equilibrium in g|[h−1,h]×[h−1,h]. It therefore
follows from Lemma 2.8 that [h, n]× [h, n] is a strict ph-best response set in
g|[h−1,n]×[h−1,n].
Example 2.2. Consider the following asymmetric supermodular game:
0 1 2
0 3, 1 0, 0 −2,−2
1 0, 0 2, 2 0, 0
2 −2,−2 0, 0 1, 3
In this game, (1, 1) is an iterated risk-dominant equilibrium and hence an
iterated strict MP-maximizer. Note that this game has no iterated p-
dominant equilibrium for p1 + p2 < 1.
If we consider symmetric games (i.e., g2(k, h) = g1(h, k) for all h ∈ A1
and k ∈ A2), the proof of Proposition 2.9 in fact shows also the following
link between iterated p-dominance and iterated risk-dominance.
Proposition 2.10. Suppose that g is a symmetric two-player supermodular
coordination game. If (h∗, h∗) is an iterated risk-dominant equilibrium of
g, then it is an iterated strict (p, p)-dominant equilibrium of g for some
p < 1/2.
Example 2.3. Consider the following symmetric supermodular game:
0 1 2
0 1, 1 0, 0 −3,−6
1 0, 0 2, 2 0, 0
2 −6,−3 0, 0 3, 3
In this game, (2, 2) is an iterated risk-dominant equilibrium and indeed an
iterated strict (2/5, 2/5)-dominant equilibrium. Observe that this game has
no (p, p)-dominant equilibrium for any p < 1/2.9
2.6 An Example: Potential versus Iterated Potential
In this subsection, while focusing on LP-maximizer, a specific form of MP-
maximizer, we provide a numerical example to demonstrate that our iter-
ative construction leads to a strictly more general concept. The following
symmetric 3× 3 game g will show that the iterated strict LP-maximizer is
strictly more general than the strict LP-maximizer:
9Note also that this game has no globally risk-dominant equilibrium as defined by
Kandori and Rob (1998).
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0 1 2
0 −1,−1 −1, 3 1, 0
1 3,−1 1, 1 0, 0
2 0, 1 0, 0 2, 2
In fact, we show that this game has no LP-maximizer while it does have
an iterated strict LP-maximizer with supermodular strict local potential
functions.
It is easy to check that {1, 2}×{1, 2} is a strict (0, 0)-best response set of
g since action 0 is strictly dominated by action 2. In addition, {2} × {2} is
a strict (1/3, 1/3)-best response set of g|{1,2}×{1,2}. Tercieux (2006b) shows
that a p-best response set with
∑
i∈I pi < 1 is an LP-maximizer set with a
supermodular local potential function. One can show that this relationship
extends to the strict versions of these notions. Hence, we have the following.
Claim 2.11. (2, 2) is an iterated strict LP-maximizer with associated inter-
vals S1 = {1, 2} × {1, 2} and S2 = {2} × {2} and with strict local potential
functions v1 and v2|{1,2}×{1,2} that are both supermodular.
Indeed, the strict local potential functions v1 and v2 can be taken re-
spectively as follows:
0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
2 0 1 1
1 2
1 1 0
2 0 2
This iterated strict LP-maximizer (2, 2) is also an iterated strict MP-
maximizer with the same potential functions v1 and v2 and thus is robust
to incomplete information as well as globally accessible (for small frictions)
and linearly absorbing according to our main results.
In what follows, we show that (2, 2) is not an LP-maximizer.
Claim 2.12. (2, 2) is not an LP-maximizer of g.
To show this, we use the following simple characterization of LP-maximizers
provided by Morris and Ui (2005, Lemma 9).
Lemma 2.13. Action profile a∗ is an LP-maximizer of g if and only if there
exists a function v : A → R such that {a∗} = argmaxa∈A v(a), and for all
i ∈ I, there exists a function µi : Ai → R+ such that if ai < a∗i , then for all
a−i ∈ A−i,
µi(ai) (v(ai + 1, a−i)− v(ai, a−i)) ≤ gi(ai + 1, a−i)− gi(ai, a−i), (2.7)
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and if ai > a∗i , then for all a−i ∈ A−i,
µi(ai) (v(ai − 1, a−i)− v(ai, a−i)) ≤ gi(ai − 1, a−i)− gi(ai, a−i). (2.8)
Proof of Claim 2.12. To prove by contradiction, assume that (2, 2) is an LP-
maximizer of g. Let v be a local potential function for (2, 2) with weight
functions {µi(·)}i∈I as in Lemma 2.13. Note first that because g1(2, 1) −
g1(1, 1) = −1 < 0, the inequality (2.7) above implies that µ1(1) > 0. In
addition, g1(1, 2) − g1(0, 2) = −1 < 0, which here again implies µ1(0) > 0.
Symmetrically, we must have that µ2(0), µ2(1) > 0. Now again using the
inequality (2.7), we must have
v(2, 2)− v(1, 2) ≤ 1
µ1(1)
(
g1(2, 2)− g1(1, 2)
)
=
2
µ1(1)
,
v(1, 2)− v(0, 2) ≤ 1
µ1(0)
(
g1(1, 2)− g1(0, 2)
)
=
−1
µ1(0)
,
v(0, 2)− v(0, 1) ≤ 1
µ2(1)
(
g2(0, 2)− g2(0, 1)
)
=
−3
µ2(1)
.
Summing up these inequalities, we have
0 < v(2, 2)− v(0, 1) ≤ 2
µ1(1)
− 1
µ1(0)
− 3
µ2(1)
, (2.9)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that {(2, 2)} = argmaxa∈A v(a).
In a similar way, we must have
v(2, 2)− v(2, 1) ≤ 1
µ2(1)
(
g2(2, 2)− g2(2, 1)
)
=
2
µ2(1)
,
v(2, 1)− v(2, 0) ≤ 1
µ2(0)
(
g2(2, 1)− g2(2, 0)
)
=
−1
µ2(0)
,
v(2, 0)− v(1, 0) ≤ 1
µ1(1)
(
g1(2, 0)− g1(1, 0)
)
=
−3
µ2(1)
.
Summing up these inequalities, we have
0 < v(2, 2)− v(1, 0) ≤ 2
µ2(1)
− 1
µ2(0)
− 3
µ1(1)
. (2.10)
Now summing up (2.9) and (2.10), we have 0 < −(1/µ1(0) + 1/µ1(1) +
1/µ2(0) + 1/µ2(1)), a contradiction since all these weights must be strictly
positive numbers.
Remark 2.3. In this paper, we use a linear order over action sets. Morris and
Ui (2005) define LP-maximizers for more general orders. It is not difficult
to show that even for such orders, (2, 2) is not an LP-maximizer of g.
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Remark 2.4. In the above game, there is no p-dominant equilibrium for
p1 + p2 < 1 while there is an iterated (p, p)-dominant equilibrium for some
p < 1/2. Hence, this example also shows, as does Example 2.3, that iterated
p-dominance is strictly more general than p-dominance. The same can
be said also in the 3 × 3 example of Young (1993); see Tercieux (2006a,
Example 1).
Remark 2.5. Morris and Ui (2005) have also shown that a p-dominant equi-
librium with
∑
i∈I pi < 1 is an LP-maximizer. Hence, this example also
demonstrates that an iterated p-dominant equilibrium with
∑
i∈I pi < 1 is
not necessarily an LP-maximizer.
Remark 2.6. One can nevertheless find, possibly by guesswork, a monotone
potential function to show that (2, 2) is actually a strict MP-maximizer in
this game. A monotone potential function is given for example by
0 1 2
0 0 0 −3
1 0 1 0
2 −3 0 2
We emphasize, however, that no systematic way to directly find an MP-
maximizer has been known beyond 2× 2 games.
2.7 An Application: Technology Adoption
In this subsection, we discuss a simple application in which an iterated strict
MP-maximizer exists and hence helps to identify a robust prediction. Our
purpose here is to demonstrate that our iterative procedures, in particular
iterated risk-dominance, can in fact be applied to an economic situation to
single out a unique equilibrium outcome as a robust prediction. We consider
the following technology choice game inspired by Kandori and Rob (1998).
There are two players i = 1, 2. Each player i chooses a technology to adopt
from a set of available technologies, denoted by {0, 1, . . . , n} and ordered by
quality (net of price). The payoff of a player choosing technology h when
the other player chooses technology k is given by
g(h, k) = q(h)− c(h, k),
where q(h) is the inherent quality of technology h and thus is increasing in h,
and c(h, k) is the cost due to incompatibility with technology k. We assume
that c(h, k) > 0 if h 6= k, while c(h, h) = 0. One way to interpret c(h, k) > 0
is that a technology-h user has to buy an adapter which enables him to work
with a technology-k user. We assume that the cost of incompatibility is of
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significance so that (h, h) is a strict Nash equilibrium for all h = 1, . . . , n.
Let denote this symmetric coordination game by g.
We impose several restrictions on the functions q and c. First, we as-
sume decreasing differences in the inherent quality of technology h, i.e., the
marginal gain from adopting technology h over technology h − 1 is strictly
decreasing in h. This is reminiscent of the standard assumption of dimin-
ishing marginal returns.
Assumption 2.1. q(h)− q(h− 1) is strictly decreasing in h.
Second, consider a situation where consumers 1 and 2 “miscoordinate”
where consumer 1 adopts technology h while consumer 2 adopts technology
h−1. We assume that the difference between the cost of the consumer with
the higher technology and that of the other consumer is increasing in h. In
other words, the relative cost of being the leader (i.e., the consumer with the
higher technology) upon miscoordination is larger when the miscoordination
occurs for higher technological standards.
Assumption 2.2. c(h, h− 1)− c(h− 1, h) is nondecreasing in h.
This assumption is satisfied, in particular, when the cost function is
symmetric so that c(h, k) = c(k, h) for all h and k.
Third, we assume that the cost function c is submodular. That is, the
marginal cost of adopting higher technologies is smaller when the other
consumer chooses higher technological standards. Hence, the consumer will
have a larger incentive to adopt higher standard when the other does so.
Thus, under this assumption, the game g will indeed be supermodular.
Assumption 2.3. For all h, c(h+ 1, k)− c(h, k) is nonincreasing in k.
We here introduce functions that will be useful in utilizing iterated risk-
dominance. For h = 1, . . . , n, let
rh =
(
g(h, h)− g(h− 1, h))− (g(h− 1, h− 1)− g(h, h− 1))
= 2× [q(h)− q(h− 1)]− [c(h, h− 1)− c(h− 1, h)] (2.11)
and
Rh =
h∑
`=1
r`, (2.12)
and R0 = 0. Observe that rh > 0 if and only if (h, h) PRD (h − 1, h − 1),
while rh < 0 if and only if (h−1, h−1) PRD (h, h) (recall that “PRD” stands
for “pairwise risk-dominates”). Accordingly, rh can be seen as a measure of
risk-dominance, and thus, Rh as the cumulative risk-dominance.
By the definition of rh, we have the following.
Lemma 2.14. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, rh is strictly decreasing
in h.
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Now we show that for a generic choice of payoffs satisfying Assumptions
2.1 and 2.2, an iteratively risk-dominant technology exists and maximizes
the cumulative risk-dominance Rh. If in addition Assumption 2.3 is satisfied,
this technology indeed constitutes an iterated strict MP-maximizer.
Proposition 2.15. Assume that the game g satisfies rh 6= 0 for all h. Under
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, if h∗ maximizes Rh, then (h∗, h∗) is a (unique)
iterated risk-dominant equilibrium of g.
If, in addition, Assumption 2.3 is satisfied, then (h∗, h∗) is a (unique)
iterated strict MP-maximizer of g.
Proof. If rh < 0 for all h ≥ 1, then h∗ = 0 maximizes Rh and (h∗, h∗) = (0, 0)
is the iterated risk-dominant equilibrium. If instead rh ≥ 0 for some h ≥ 1,
then under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and by the generic choice of payoffs,
it follows from Lemma 2.14 that there is a unique h∗ ≥ 1 such that rh > 0
if and only if h ≤ h∗. Clearly, such h∗ maximizes Rh and (h∗, h∗) is the
iterated risk-dominant equilibrium.
If Assumption 2.3 holds, then g becomes supermodular. From Proposi-
tion 2.9, it therefore follows that under Assumptions 2.1–2.3 the equilibrium
(h∗, h∗) obtained above is an iterated strict MP-maximizer.
Our main results together with the proposition above show that the iter-
ated strict MP-maximizer (h∗, h∗) is a unique equilibrium that is robust to
incomplete information as well as globally accessible and linearly absorbing
under perfect foresight dynamics with small frictions. Thus (h∗, h∗) can be
seen as a unique, robust prediction, which allows comparative statics anal-
ysis. For example, the technology h∗ is larger when, for each technological
standard h, the marginal productivity, q(h)−q(h−1), is larger or the relative
cost of miscoordination for the leader, c(h, h− 1)− c(h− 1, h), is smaller.
3 Robustness to Incomplete Information
3.1 ε-Elaborations and Robust Equilibria
Given the game g, we consider the following class of incomplete information
games. Each player i ∈ I has a countable set of types, denoted by Ti. We
write T =
∏
i∈I Ti and T−i =
∏
j 6=i Ti. The prior probability distribution on
T is given by P . We assume that P satisfies that
∑
t−i∈T−i P (ti, t−i) > 0
for all i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti. Let ∆0(T ) be the set of such probability distribu-
tions on T . Under this assumption, the conditional probability of t−i given
ti, P (t−i|ti), is well-defined by P (t−i|ti) = P (ti, t−i)/
∑
t′−i∈T−i P (ti, t
′
−i).
An event T ′ ⊂ T is said to be a simple event if it is a product of sets
of types of each player, i.e., T ′ =
∏
i∈I T
′
i where each T
′
i ⊂ Ti. Given a
simple event T ′, we write T ′−i = T
′
1 × · · · × T ′i−1 × T ′i+1 × · · · × T ′N and
P (T ′−i|ti) =
∑
t−i∈T ′−i P (t−i|ti). The payoff function for player i ∈ I is a
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bounded function ui : A × T → R. Denote u = (ui)i∈I . Fixing type space
T , we represent an incomplete information game by (u, P ).
A (behavioral) strategy for player i is a function σi : Ti → ∆(Ai), where
∆(Ai) is the set of probability distributions over Ai. Denote by Σi the
set of strategies for player i, and let Σ =
∏
i∈I Σi, σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ,
Σ−i =
∏
j 6=iΣj , and σ−i = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ−i. For a strategy
σi, we denote by σi(ai|ti) the probability that ai ∈ Ai is chosen at ti ∈ Ti.
We write σ(a|t) =∏i∈I σi(ai|ti) and σ−i(a−i|t−i) =∏j 6=i σj(aj |tj). We also
write σP (a) =
∑
t∈T P (t)σ(a|t). We endow Σ with the topology of uniform
convergence on finite subsets of T .10 The set Σ is convex, and compact with
respect to this topology.
We define σi - σ′i for σi, σ′i ∈ Σi by σi(ti) - σ′i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti; σ - σ′
for σ, σ′ ∈ Σ by σi - σ′i for all i ∈ I; and σ−i - σ′−i for σ−i, σ′−i ∈ Σ−i by
σj - σ′j for all j 6= i.
The expected payoff to player i with type ti ∈ Ti playing h ∈ Ai against
strategy profile σ−i is given by
Ui(h, σ−i)(ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)ui
(
(h, σ−i(t−i)), (ti, t−i)
)
,
where ui((h, σ−i(t−i)), t) =
∑
a−i∈A−i σ−i(a−i|t−i)ui((h, a−i), t). Let
BRi : Σ−i × Ti → Ai be defined for each i by
BRi(σ−i)(ti) = argmax{Ui(h, σ−i)(ti) | h ∈ Ai}.
Note that for each i ∈ I, the correspondence BRi is upper semi-continuous
since Ui is continuous.
Definition 3.1. A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
(u, P ) if for all i ∈ I, all h ∈ Ai, and all ti ∈ Ti,
σi(h|ti) > 0⇒ h ∈ BRi(σ−i)(ti).
Let βi : Σ−i → Σi be player i’s best response correspondence in (u, P ),
defined by
βi(σ−i) =
{
ξi ∈ Σi
∣∣ ∀h ∈ Ai, ∀ ti ∈ Ti :[
ξi(h|ti) > 0⇒ h ∈ BRi(σ−i)(ti)
]}
, (3.1)
and β : Σ → Σ be given by β(σ) = ∏i∈I βi(σ−i). A Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of (u, P ), σ ∈ Σ, is a fixed point of β, i.e., σ ∈ β(σ). Since β is
nonempty-, convex-, and compact-valued and upper semi-continuous, the
existence of Bayesian Nash equilibria then follows from Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
10This topology is metrizable by the metric dµ defined by dµ(σ, σ
′) = supt∈T µ(t)
˛˛
σ(t)−
σ′(t)
˛˛
for µ ∈ ∆(T ) such that supp(µ) = T .
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Given g, let T gii be the set of types ti such that payoffs of player i of
type ti is given by gi and he knows his payoffs:
T gii = {ti ∈ Ti |ui(a, (ti, t−i)) = gi(a)
for all a ∈ A and all t−i ∈ T−i with P (ti, t−i) > 0}.
Denote T g =
∏
i T
gi
i .
Definition 3.2. Let ε ∈ [0, 1]. An incomplete information game (u, P ) is
an ε-elaboration of g if P (T g) = 1− ε.
Following Kajii and Morris (1997), we say that a∗ is robust if, for small
ε > 0, every ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ with
σP (a∗) close to 1.
Definition 3.3. Action profile a∗ ∈ A is robust to all elaborations in g if
for every δ > 0, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε¯, any ε-elaboration
(u, P ) of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ such that σP (a∗) ≥ 1− δ.
Given P ∈ ∆0(T ), we write for any function f : A→ R
BRif (σ−i|Si)(ti) = argmax
h∈Si
∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)f(h, σ−i(t−i)),
where Si ⊂ Ai, σ−i ∈ Σ−i, and ti ∈ Ti. Note that this can be written as
BRif (σ−i|Si)(ti) = br if (pitii (σ−i)|Si)
where pitii (σ−i) ∈ ∆(A−i) is given by
pitii (σ−i)(a−i) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σ−i(a−i|t−i).
Thus, if f |Si×A−i is supermodular, then whenever σ−i - σ′−i, we have
minBRif (σ−i|Si)(ti) ≤ minBRif (σ′−i|Si)(ti),
maxBRif (σ−i|Si)(ti) ≤ maxBRif (σ′−i|Si)(ti).
3.2 Informational Robustness of Iterated MP-Maximizer
In this subsection, we state and prove our first main result, which shows
that under certain monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is
robust to incomplete information.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that g has an iterated MP-maximizer a∗ with as-
sociated intervals (Sk)mk=0 and monotone potential functions (v
k)mk=1. If for
each k = 1, . . . ,m, gi|Sk−1i ×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I or v
k|Sk−1i ×A−i
is supermodular for all i ∈ I, then a∗ is robust to all elaborations in g.
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Due to Lemma 2.2, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that g has an iterated strict MP-maximizer a∗ with
associated intervals (Sk)mk=0 and strict monotone potential functions (v
k)mk=1.
If for each k = 1, . . . ,m, gi|Sk−1i ×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I or v
k|Sk−1
is supermodular, then a∗ is robust to all elaborations in g.
Suppose that a∗ is an iterated MP-maximizer of g with monotone po-
tential functions (vk)mk=1 that are relative to B2η(S
k−1) respectively for
k = 1, . . . ,m, where η > 0 is sufficiently small so that for all i ∈ I and
all k = 1, . . . ,m,
br igi(pii) ∩ Ski 6= ∅,
and therefore,
br igi(pii|Ski ) ⊂ br igi(pii)
hold for pii ∈ B2η(Sk−i) (see Lemma 2.3). For each k = 0, 1, . . . ,m and i ∈ I,
write Ski = [a
k
i , a
k
i ], where 0 = a
0
i ≤ a1i ≤ · · · ≤ ami = a∗i = ami ≤ · · · ≤ a1i ≤
a0i = ni. We assume without loss of generality that for all k = 1, . . . ,m,
Sk 6= Sk−1, i.e., for some i ∈ I, aki 6= ak−1i or aki 6= ak−1i .
Now, given P ∈ ∆0(T ), define JkP : Σ→ R for each k = 1, . . . ,m to be
JkP (σ) =
∑
t∈T
P (t)vk(σ(t)),
and for any ξ, ζ ∈ Σ such that ξ(t) ∈ ∏i∆([a0i , ak−1i ]) and ζ(t) ∈∏
i∆([a
k−1
i , a
0
i ]) for all t ∈ T , and any simple event T ′ ⊂ T , let
Σk,−ξ,T ′ = {σ ∈ Σ | ∀ i ∈ I : σi(ti) = ξi(ti) ∀ ti ∈ Ti \ T ′i ,
σi(ti) ∈ ∆([ak−1i , aki ]) ∀ ti ∈ T ′i},
Σk,+ζ,T ′ = {σ ∈ Σ | ∀ i ∈ I : σi(ti) = ζi(ti) ∀ ti ∈ Ti \ T ′i ,
σi(ti) ∈ ∆([aki , ak−1i ]) ∀ ti ∈ T ′i}.
Consider the maximization problems:
max JkP (σ) s.t. σ ∈ Σk,−ξ,T ′ , (3.2)
max JkP (σ) s.t. σ ∈ Σk,+ζ,T ′ . (3.3)
Since JkP is continuous, and Σ
k,−
ξ,T ′ and Σ
k,+
ζ,T ′ are compact, the above maxi-
mization problems admit solutions.
Lemma 3.3. (1) For each k = 1, . . . ,m and for any P ∈ ∆0(T ), any
simple event T ′ ⊂ T , and any ξ, ζ ∈ Σ such that ξ(t) ∈ ∏i∆([a0i , aki ])
and ζ(t) ∈ ∏i∆([aki , a0i ]) for all t ∈ T : there exists a solution σk,− to the
maximization problem (3.2) such that
σk,−i (ti) = minBR
i
vk(σ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) (3.4)
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for all i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T ′i ; and there exists a solution σk,+ to the maxi-
mization problem (3.3) such that
σk,+i (ti) = maxBR
i
vk(σ
k,+
−i |[aki , ak−1i ])(ti) (3.5)
for all i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T ′i .
(2) For each k = 1, . . . ,m, there exists κk > 0 such that for any
P ∈ ∆0(T ), any simple event T ′ ⊂ T , and any ξ, ζ ∈ Σ such that
ξ(t) ∈ ∏i∆([a0i , aki ]) and ζ(t) ∈ ∏i∆([aki , a0i ]) for all t ∈ T : any solution σ
to the maximization problem (3.2) satisfies
σP (ak) ≥ 1− κkP (T \ T ′);
and any solution σ to the maximization problem (3.3) satisfies
σP (ak) ≥ 1− κkP (T \ T ′).
Proof. (1) We only show the existence of a solution that satisfies (3.4) (the
existence of a solution that satisfies (3.5) is proved similarly). First note
that for each i,∑
t−i∈T−i
P (ti, t−i)vk(σ(ti, t−i))
=
(∑
t′−i∈T−i
P (ti, t′−i)
)∑
h∈Ai
σi(h|ti)Uki (h, σ−i)(ti) (3.6)
for all ti ∈ T ′i , where
Uki (h, σ−i)(ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti) vk
(
(h, σ−i(t−i)), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Therefore, any solution to (3.2), σk, satisfies, for all i ∈ I,
σki (h|ti) > 0⇒ h ∈ BRivk(σk−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) (3.7)
for all ti ∈ T ′i .
Since JkP is continuous on Σ
k,−
ξ,T ′ , the set of maximizers is a nonempty,
closed, and hence compact, subset of Σk,−ξ,T ′ . Hence, a minimal optimal solu-
tion (with respect to the order - on Σ) exists by Zorn’s lemma (see Lemma
A.2.2 in OTH (2008)). Let σk,− be such a minimal solution.
Take any i ∈ I, and consider the strategy σi given by
σi(ti) =
{
ξi(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti \ T ′i
minBRivk(σ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) for all ti ∈ T ′i .
By the definition of σi together with equation (3.7), we have σi - σk,−i . On
the other hand, by equation (3.6)
JkP (σi, σ
k,−
−i ) ≥ JkP (σk,−),
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meaning that (σi, σ
k,−
−i ) ∈ Σk,−ξ,T ′ is also optimal. Hence, the minimality of
σk,− implies that σi(ti) = σ
k,−
i (ti) for all ti ∈ Ti. Thus, we have (3.4).
(2) Let vkmax = v
k(ak) = vk(ak), vk = maxa∈A\[ak,ak] v
k(a), and vk =
mina∈A vk(a). Note that vkmax > vk ≥ vk. Set κk = (vkmax − vk)/(vkmax −
vk). Then, the same argument in the proof of Theorem 3 in Ui (2001) will
establish the conclusion. Let σ˜ ∈ Σk,−ξ,T ′ be such that, σ˜(ak|t) = 1 for all
t ∈ T ′. Let σ be any solution to the maximization problem (3.2). Hence we
have
JkP (σ) ≥ JkP (σ˜) =
∑
t∈T ′
∑
a∈A
P (t)σ˜(a|t)vk(a) +
∑
t∈T\T ′
∑
a∈A
P (t)σ˜(a|t)vk(a)
= P (T ′)vkmax +
∑
t∈T\T ′
∑
a∈A
P (t)σ˜(a|t)vk(a)
≥ P (T ′)vkmax + [1− P (T ′)]vk.
We also have
JkP (σ) =
∑
a∈A
[∑
t∈T
P (t)σ(a|t)
]
v(a)
=
∑
a∈A
σP (a)v(a)
= σP (ak)vkmax +
∑
a 6=ak
σP (a)v(a)
≤ σP (ak)vkmax + (1− σP (ak))vk.
Combining the above inequalities, we have:
σP (ak)vkmax + (1− σP (ak))vk ≥ P (T ′)vkmax + [1− P (T ′)]vk
and thus,
σP (ak) ≥ 1− v
k
max − vk
vkmax − vk
P (T \ T ′),
as claimed.
We will need the following lemma, the proof of which mimics that of
Lemma B in Kajii and Morris (1997).
Lemma 3.4. Given any simple event S ⊂ T , let
T ′i = Si ∩ {ti ∈ Ti |P (S−i|ti) ≥ 1− η}
for i ∈ I, and T ′ =∏i∈I T ′i . Then,
1− P (T ′) ≤ γ(1− P (S)),
where γ = 1 +N(1− η)/η > 0.
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Proof. Let Bi = {ti ∈ Ti |P (S−i|ti) ≥ 1 − η} and B =
∏
i∈I Bi. By Kajii
and Morris (1997, Lemma A), we have
P (S ∩ (Bci × T−i)) ≤
1− η
η
P ((Bci × T−i) \ S)
for all i ∈ I. Note then that
P (S \B) ≤
∑
i∈I
P (S ∩ (Bci × T−i)) ≤ N
1− η
η
P ((Bci′ × T−i′) \ S)
for some i′ ∈ I. We therefore have
1− P (T ′) = P (S \B) + P (T \ S)
≤ N 1− η
η
P ((Bci′ × T−i′) \ S) + P (T \ S)
≤ N 1− η
η
P (T \ S) + P (T \ S)
= γP (T \ S),
as claimed.
In the following, we let σ0,−, σ0,+ ∈ Σ be such that σ0,−(t) = a0 and
σ0,+(t) = a0 for all t ∈ T , respectively.
Lemma 3.5. There exist c1, . . . , cm > 0 such that for any P ∈ ∆0(T ) and
any simple event T 0 ⊂ T , there exist σ1,−, . . . , σm,−, σ1,+, . . . , σm,+ ∈ Σ and
simple events T 1, . . . , Tm−1 ⊂ T with T 0 ⊃ T 1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Tm−1 such that for
each k = 1, . . . ,m,
(∗−k ) for all i ∈ I, σk,−i (ti) = σk−1,−i (ti) for all ti ∈ Ti \ T k−1i ,
σk,−i (ti) = minBR
i
vk(σ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) for all ti ∈ T k−1i (3.8)
and∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σk,−−i ([ak−1−i , a∗−i]|t−i) ≥ 1−η for all ti ∈ T k−1i , (3.9)
and σk,−P (a
k) ≥ 1− ckP (T \ T 0).
and
(∗+k ) for all i ∈ I, σk,+i (t) = σk−1,+i (t) for all ti ∈ Ti \ T k−1i ,
σk,+i (ti) = maxBR
i
vk(σ
k,+
−i |[aki , ak−1i ])(ti) for all ti ∈ T k−1i (3.10)
and ∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σk,+−i ([a∗−i, ak−1−i ]|t−i) ≥ 1− η for all ti ∈ T k−1i ,
(3.11)
and σk,+P (a
k) ≥ 1− ckP (T \ T 0).
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Proof. Let κ1, . . . , κm > 0 be as in Lemma 3.3(2) and γ as in Lemma 3.4.
Set ck = (2γ)k−1κ1 · · ·κk for k = 1, . . . ,m. Fix any P ∈ ∆0(T ) and any
simple event T 0 ⊂ T . First, by Lemma 3.3 for (3.2) and (3.3) with k = 1,
ξ = σ0,−, ζ = σ0,+, and T ′ = T 0, we have σ1,− and σ1,+ that satisfy (∗−1 )
and (∗+1 ), respectively.
Next, for k ≥ 2 assume that there exist T 1, . . . , T k−2, σ1,−, . . . , σk−1,−,
and σ1,+, . . . , σk−1,+ that satisfy (∗−1 ), . . . , (∗−k−1) and (∗+1 ), . . . , (∗+k−1), re-
spectively. We can assume that there is no redundancy in T 1, . . . , T k−2 (if
k ≥ 3); i.e., for all ` = 2, . . . , k − 1, if a`i = a`−1i and a`i = a`−1i , then
T `−1i = T
`−2
i . Let
Sk−1i = T
k−2
i ∩ {ti ∈ Ti | σk−1,−i (ti) = ak−1i and σk−1,+i (ti) = ak−1i }
for each i ∈ I, and Sk−1 =∏i∈I Sk−1i . Let also
T k−1i = S
k−1
i ∩ {ti ∈ Ti |P (Sk−1−i |ti) ≥ 1− η} (3.12)
for each i ∈ I, and T k−1 =∏i∈I T k−1i . Note that T k−1 ⊂ T k−2.
Now consider the maximization problems (3.2) and (3.3) with ξ =
σk−1,−, ζ = σk−1,+, and T ′ = T k−1. Then by Lemma 3.3, we have σk,−
and σk,+ that satisfy (3.8) and (3.10), and σk,−P (a
k) ≥ 1 − κkP (T \ T k−1)
and σk,+P (a
k) ≥ 1−κkP (T \T k−1), respectively. Since σk,−−i ([ak−1−i , a∗−i]|t−i) =
σk,+−i ([a
∗
−i, a
k−1
−i ]|t−i) = 1 for all t−i ∈ Sk−1−i (by the definition of Sk−1−i and
the maximization problems), it follows that∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σk,−−i ([ak−1−i , a∗−i]|t−i)
≥
∑
t−i∈Sk−1−i
P (t−i|ti)σk,−−i ([ak−1−i , a∗−i]|t−i) = P (Sk−1−i |ti) ≥ 1− η
for all i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T k−1i , where the last inequality follows from the
definition of T k−1i , (3.12). This means that σ
k,− satisfies (3.9). Note that
since σk−1,− and σk−1,+ are pure strategies, σk−1,−P (a
k−1) = P ({t ∈ T |
σk−1,−(t) = ak−1}) and σk−1,+P (ak−1) = P ({t ∈ T | σk−1,+(t) = ak−1}).
Since, by the no-redundancy assumption, for all t ∈ T \ T k−2, there exists
an i ∈ I such that σk−1,−i (ti) < ak−1i or σk−1,+i (ti) > ak−1i , it follows that
Sk−1 = {t ∈ T | σk−1,−(t) = ak−1 and σk−1,+(t) = ak−1}. Hence,
P (T \ Sk−1) ≤ P (T \ {t ∈ T | σk−1,−(t) = ak−1})
+ P (T \ {t ∈ T | σk−1,+(t) = ak−1})
=
(
1− σk−1,−P (ak−1)
)
+
(
1− σk−1,+P (ak−1)
)
≤ 2ck−1P (T \ T 0). (3.13)
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Thus, we have
σk,−P (a
k) ≥ 1− κkP (T \ T k−1) ≥ 1− κk × γP (T \ Sk−1)
≥ 1− κkγ × 2ck−1P (T \ T 0) = 1− ckP (T \ T 0),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.3, the second inequality
follows from Lemma 3.4, and the third inequality follows from (3.13). The
same argument applies to σk,+.
Lemma 3.6. For every δ > 0, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that for any ε-
elaboration (u, P ) with ε ≤ ε¯, there exist σ−, σ+ ∈ Σ and simple events
T 1, . . . , Tm−1 ⊂ T with T g = T 0 ⊃ T 1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Tm−1 ⊃ Tm = ∅ such that
(∗−) for all i ∈ I, σ−i (ti) = a0i for all ti ∈ Ti \ T gii ,
σ−i (ti) = minBR
i
vk(σ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki (3.14)
and∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σ−−i([ak−1−i , a∗−i]|t−i) ≥ 1− η for all ti ∈ T k−1i (3.15)
for each k = 1, . . . ,m, and σ−P (a
∗) ≥ 1− δ,
and
(∗+) for all i ∈ I, σ+i (ti) = a0i for all ti ∈ Ti \ T gii ,
σ+i (ti) = maxBR
i
vk(σ
+
−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti) for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki (3.16)
and∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σ+−i([a∗−i, ak−1−i ]|t−i) ≥ 1− η for all ti ∈ T k−1i (3.17)
for each k = 1, . . . ,m, and σ+P (a
∗) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. Take c1, . . . , cm > 0 as in Lemma 3.5. Given any δ > 0, let ε¯ =
δ/cm. Fix any ε-elaboration (u, P ) of g with ε ≤ ε¯, and let T 0 = T g.
Then take σ0,−, . . . , σm,− and σ0,+, . . . , σm,+ that satisfy (∗−k ) and (∗+k ) for
k = 1, . . . ,m, respectively, with T 1, . . . , Tm−1 ⊂ T . Set σ− = σm,− and
σ+ = σm,+. We only verify that σ− satisfies (∗−).
By construction, we have (3.15) for each k = 1, . . . ,m. We also have
σ−P (a
∗) ≥ 1− δ by (∗−m).
Consider any k = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Note from (3.12) that∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σk,−−i (ak−i|t−i) ≥ 1− η,
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for all ti ∈ T ki . It follows by the choice of η that for all i ∈ I,
σk,−i (ti) = minBR
i
vk(σ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) = aki
for all ti ∈ T ki (⊂ T k−1i ), so that σk,−(t) = ak and hence σ−(t) ∈ [ak, a∗]
for all t ∈ T k. Note also that σ−(t) = σk,−(t) for all t ∈ T \ T k. Since
vk(a) = vk(a′) for all a, a′ ∈ [ak, ak], it follows that for all i ∈ I and all
ti ∈ T k−1i , BRivk(σ−−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) = BRivk(σk,−−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(ti). Therefore,
for all i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki ,
σ−−i(ti) = σ
k,−
−i (ti) = minBR
i
vk(σ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(ti)
= minBRivk(σ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti),
which means that σ− satisfies (3.14).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose that vk’s are monotone potential functions
for a∗ relative to B2η([ak−1, ak−1]). Let δ > 0 be given Take ε¯ as in
Lemma 3.6. Fix any ε-elaboration (u, P ) with ε ≤ ε¯, and take σ−, σ+,
and T 0, T 1, . . . , Tm that satisfy (∗−) and (∗+), respectively. Let Σ˜ = {σ ∈
Σ | σ− - σ - σ+}. We will show that β˜(σ) = β(σ) ∩ Σ˜ is nonempty for
any σ ∈ Σ˜, where β is the best response correspondence of (u, P ) defined
in (3.1). Then, since Σ˜ is convex and compact, it follows from Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem that the nonempty-, convex-, and compact-valued upper
semi-continuous correspondence β has a fixed point σ∗ ∈ β˜(σ∗) ⊂ Σ˜, which
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u, P ) and satisfies σ− - σ∗ - σ+. Since
both σ− and σ+ satisfy σ−P (a
∗) ≥ 1− δ and σ+P (a∗) ≥ 1− δ, respectively, σ∗
satisfies σ∗P (a
∗) ≥ 1− 2δ.
Take any σ ∈ Σ˜. For ti ∈ Ti \ T 0i , BRigi(σ)(ti) ⊂ [σ−i (ti), σ+i (ti)] holds.
Consider any k = 1, . . . ,m. Note that∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σ−i([ak−1−i , ak−1−i ]|t−i) ≥ 1− 2η
for all i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T k−1i .
Suppose first that gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i are supermodular for all i ∈ I. Then,
for all i ∈ I,
minBRivk(σ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) ≤ maxBRigi(σ−−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti)
≤ maxBRigi(σ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti)
for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki , where the second inequality follows from
the assumption that vk is a monotone potential function relative to
B2η([ak−1, ak−1]), and the third inequality follows from the supermodularity
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of gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i . Similarly, for all i ∈ I,
maxBRivk(σ
+
−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti) ≥ minBRigi(σ+−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti)
≥ minBRigi(σ−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti)
for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki .
Suppose next that vk|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i are supermodular for all i ∈ I.
Then, for all i ∈ I,
minBRivk(σ
−|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) ≤ minBRivk(σ|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti)
≤ maxBRigi(σ|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti)
for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki , where the second inequality follows from the su-
permodularity of vk|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i , and the third inequality follows from
the assumption that vk is a monotone potential function relative to
B2η([ak−1, ak−1]). Similarly, for all i ∈ I,
maxBRivk(σ
+|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti) ≥ maxBRivk(σ|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti)
≥ minBRigi(σ|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti)
for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki .
Therefore, in each case, we have for all ti ∈ T k−1i \ T ki ,
maxBRigi(σ|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti) ≥ minBRivk(σ−|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti),
minBRigi(σ|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti) ≤ maxBRivk(σ+|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti).
Since ∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i|ti)σ−i([ak−1−i , ak−1−i ]|t−i) ≥ 1− 2η
for all i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T k−1i and hence
BRigi(σ)(ti) ∩ [ak−1i , ak−1i ] 6= ∅
by the choice of η, it follows that
BRigi(σ)(ti)
∩ [minBRivk(σ−|[ak−1i , aki ])(ti),maxBRivk(σ+|[aki , ak−1i ])(ti)] 6= ∅.
This implies the nonemptiness of β˜(σ).
By Proposition 2.5, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 3.7. If a∗ is an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium of g with∑
i∈I pi < 1, then a
∗ is robust to all elaborations in g.
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3.3 Uniqueness of Robust Equilibrium and Iterated p-
Dominance
Our first theorem, together with our results provided in Subsection 2.4,
shows that an iterated p-dominant equilibrium with low p is actually robust
to incomplete information. In this subsection, we prove a stronger result:
when an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium with low p exists, it is the
unique robust equilibrium.
Proposition 3.8. An iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium of g with∑
i∈I pi < 1 is the unique robust equilibrium in g.
This proposition is a corollary to the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose that a∗ is an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium
of g with
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists an ε-elaboration
where the strategy profile σ∗ such that σ∗(t) = a∗ for all t ∈ T is the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let a∗ be an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium with
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1
and (S0, . . . , Sm) an associated sequence. Let qi = (pi/
∑
j∈I pj) ≥ pi for
each i ∈ I (we can assume without loss of generality that pi > 0 for all
i). Note that
∑
i∈I qi = 1. Now let Ti = Z+ = {0, 1, 2, . . .} for each i ∈ I.
For each ε > 0, we construct an ε-elaboration (u, P ε) as follows. Define
P ε ∈ ∆0(T ) by
P ε(t1, . . . , tN ) =
{
ε(1− ε)τqi if ti = τ + 1 and tj = τ for all j 6= i,
0 otherwise,
and ui : A× T → R for each i ∈ I by
ui(a; t) =

gi(a) if ti 6= 0,
1 if ti = 0 and ai = a∗i ,
0 if ti = 0 and ai 6= a∗i .
Fix any ε > 0, and let us now study the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of
(u, P ε).
Consider the sequence of modified incomplete information games
{(u|Sk , P ε)}m−1k=0 where in (u|Sk , P ε), the set of actions available to player
i ∈ I is Ski and player i’s payoff function ui|Ski : S
k × T → R is given by
the restriction of ui to Sk × T . We want to show that any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of (u, P ε), σ∗, satisfies σ∗(t) = a∗ for all t ∈ T .
First note that if σ∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u, P ε) such
that for k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, supp(σ∗(t)) ⊂ Sk for all t ∈ T , then σ∗ is an
equilibrium of (u|Sk , P ε). It is therefore sufficient to show that for each
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k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, any Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ∗ of (u|Sk−1 , P ε) is such
that supp(σ∗(t)) ⊂ Sk for all t ∈ T . We proceed by induction.
Let σ∗ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u|Sk−1 , P ε). We show that
for all i ∈ I, ∑ai∈Ski σ∗i (ai|τ) = 1 for all τ ≥ 0. By construction, for all
i ∈ I, ∑ai∈Ski σ∗i (ai|0) = 1. Our inductive hypothesis is that for all i ∈ I,∑
ai∈Ski σ
∗
i (ai|τ) = 1. Take any i ∈ I and consider the type ti = τ + 1. By
construction of the type space, we have
P ε((t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . tN )|τ + 1) = ε(1− ε)
τqi
ε(1− ε)τqi +
∑
j 6=i ε(1− ε)τ+1qj
> qi ≥ pi
if tj = τ for all j 6= i. Thus by the inductive hypothesis, each agent i assigns
a probability strictly above pi to the other players playing actions in Sk−i.
But since Sk is a strict p-best response set of g|Sk−1 and since τ + 1 ∈ T uii ,
this implies that
∑
ai∈Ski σ
∗
i (ai|τ + 1) = 1. Thus our inductive hypothesis
holds for τ + 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. If a∗ is an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium
with
∑
i∈I pi < 1, then it is an iterated MP-maximizer with supermodular
monotone potential functions by Proposition 2.5 and hence is robust to all
elaborations by Theorem 3.1. But by Lemma 3.9, no action profile other
than a∗ is played in any robust equilibrium.
4 Stability under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
4.1 Perfect Foresight Paths and Stability Concepts
Given the game g, we consider the following dynamic societal game. Society
consists of N continua of agents, one for each role in g. In each population,
agents are identical and anonymous. At each point in time, one agent is
selected randomly from each population and matched to form an N -tuple
and play g. Agents cannot switch actions at every point in time. Instead,
every agent must make a commitment to a particular action for a random
time interval. Time instants at which each agent can switch actions follow a
Poisson process with the arrival rate λ > 0. The processes are independent
across agents. We choose without loss of generality the unit of time in such
a way that λ = 1.
The action distribution in population i ∈ I at time t ∈ R+ is denoted by
φi(t) = (φih(t))h∈Ai ∈ ∆(Ai), where φih(t) is the fraction of agents who are
committing to action h ∈ Ai at time t. Let φ(t) = (φi(t))i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai)
and φ−i(t) = (φj(t))j 6=i ∈
∏
j 6=i∆(Aj). Due to the assumption that the
switching times follow independent Poisson processes with arrival rate λ = 1,
φih(·) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1, which implies in
particular that it is differentiable at almost all t ≥ 0.
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Definition 4.1. A path φ : R+ →
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is said to be feasible if it is
Lipschitz continuous, and for all i ∈ I and almost all t ≥ 0, there exists
αi(t) ∈ ∆(Ai) such that
φ˙i(t) = αi(t)− φi(t). (4.1)
Denote by Φi the set of feasible paths for population i, and let Φ =∏
i∈I Φ
i and Φ−i =
∏
j 6=iΦ
j . For x ∈ ∏i∈I ∆(Ai), the set of feasible paths
starting from x is denoted by Φx =
∏
iΦ
i
x. We endow Φx with the topology
of uniform convergence on compact intervals.11 The set Φx is convex, and
compact with respect to this topology.
We define φi - ψi for φi, ψi ∈ Φi by φi(t) - ψi(t) for all t ≥ 0; φ - ψ
for φ, ψ ∈ Φ by φi - ψi for all i ∈ I; and φ−i - ψ−i for φ−i, ψ−i ∈ Φ−i by
φj - ψj for all j 6= i. Note that if φ(0) - ψ(0) and φ˙(t)+φ(t) - ψ˙(t)+ψ(t)
for almost all t ≥ 0, then φ - ψ.
A revising agent in population i anticipates the future evolution of the
action distribution, and commits to an action that maximizes his expected
discounted payoff. The expected discounted payoff of committing to action
h ∈ Ai at time t with a given anticipated path φ−i ∈ Φ−i is given by
Vih(φ−i)(t) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ t+s
t
e−θ(z−t)gi(h, φ−i(z)) dz e−sds
= (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
t
e−(1+θ)(s−t)gi(h, φ−i(s)) ds,
where θ > 0 is a common discount rate. Following Matsui and Matsuyama
(1995), we view θ/λ = θ as the degree of friction.
Let BRigi : Φ
−i × R+ → Ai be defined for each i by
BRigi(φ−i)(t) = argmax{Vih(φ−i)(t) | h ∈ Ai}.
Note that for each i ∈ I, the correspondence BRigi is upper semi-continuous
since Vi is continuous.
Definition 4.2. A feasible path φ is said to be a perfect foresight path in g
if for all i ∈ I, all h ∈ Ai, and almost all t ≥ 0,
φ˙ih(t) > −φih(t)⇒ h ∈ BRigi(φ−i)(t).
Let βix : Φ
−i
x → Φix be defined by
βix(φ−i) = {ψi ∈ Φix | ψ˙ih(t) > −ψih(t)⇒ h ∈ BRigi(φ−i)(t) a.e.}, (4.2)
and βx : Φx → Φx be given by βx(φ) =
∏
i β
i
x(φ−i). A perfect foresight path
φ with φ(0) = x is a fixed point of βx : Φx → Φx, i.e., φ ∈ βx(φ). Verify that
11This topology is metrizable by the metric dr defined by dr(φ, φ
′) = supt≥0 e
−rt ˛˛φ(t)−
φ′(t)
˛˛
for r > 0.
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βx is nonempty-, convex-, and compact-valued and upper semi-continuous
(see, e.g., OTH (2008, Remark 2.1)). The existence of perfect foresight paths
then follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
Following Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) and OTH (2008), we employ
the following stability concepts.
Definition 4.3. (a) a∗ ∈ A is globally accessible in g if for any x ∈∏i∆(Ai),
there exists a perfect foresight path from x that converges to a∗.
(b) a∗ ∈ A is absorbing in g if there exists ε > 0 such that any perfect
foresight path from any x ∈ Bε(a∗) converges to a∗.
(c) a∗ ∈ A is linearly absorbing in g if there exists ε > 0 such that for
any x ∈ Bε(a∗), the linear path to a∗ is a unique perfect foresight path from
x.
Given θ > 0, we write for any function f : A→ R
BRif (φ−i|Si)(t) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
t
e−(1+θ)(s−t)f(h, φ−i(s)) ds, ,
where Si ⊂ Ai, φ−i ∈ Φ−i, and t ≥ 0. Note that this can be written as
BRif (φ−i|Si)(t) = br if (pitii (φ−i)|Si)
where pitii (φ−i) ∈ ∆(A−i) is given by
pitii (φ−i)(a−i) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
t
e−(1+θ)(s−t)
(∏
j 6=i φjaj (s)
)
ds.
Thus, if f |Si×A−i is supermodular, then whenever φ−i - φ′−i, we have
minBRif (φ−i|Si)(t) ≤ minBRif (φ′−i|Si)(t),
maxBRif (φ−i|Si)(t) ≤ maxBRif (φ′−i|Si)(t).
4.2 Global Accessibility of Iterated MP-Maximizer
In this subsection, we move to our second main result. We show that un-
der the same monotonicity conditions as in the incomplete information case,
an iterated MP-maximizer is selected by the perfect foresight dynamics ap-
proach.
In addition, as will become clear, by exploiting the similarity between the
mathematical structures of incomplete information elaborations and perfect
foresight dynamics, we provide a proof of this result that is strongly related
to the proof of our first main result.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that g has an iterated MP-maximizer a∗ with as-
sociated intervals (Sk)mk=0 and monotone potential functions (v
k)mk=1. If for
each k = 1, . . . ,m, gi|Sk−1i ×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I or v
k|Sk−1i ×A−i
is supermodular for all i ∈ I, then there exists θ¯ > 0 such that a∗ is globally
accessible in g for all θ ∈ (0, θ¯).
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Due to Lemma 2.2, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that g has an iterated strict MP-maximizer a∗ with
associated intervals (Sk)mk=0 and strict monotone potential functions (v
k)mk=1.
If for each k = 1, . . . ,m, gi|Sk−1i ×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I or v
k|Sk−1
is supermodular, then there exists θ¯ > 0 such that a∗ is globally accessible in
g for all θ ∈ (0, θ¯).
Suppose that a∗ is an iterated MP-maximizer of g with monotone po-
tential functions (vk)mk=1 that are relative to Bη(S
k−1) respectively for
k = 1, . . . ,m, where η > 0 is sufficiently small so that for all i ∈ I and
all k = 1, . . . ,m,
br igi(pii) ∩ Ski 6= ∅,
and therefore,
br igi(pii|Ski ) ⊂ br igi(pii)
hold for pii ∈ Bη(Sk−i) (see Lemma 2.3). For each k = 0, 1, . . . ,m and i ∈ I,
write Ski = [a
k
i , a
k
i ], where 0 = a
0
i ≤ a1i ≤ · · · ≤ ami = a∗i = ami ≤ · · · ≤ a1i ≤
a0i = ni.
For each k = 1, . . . ,m, define Jkθ : Φ→ R to be
Jkθ (φ) =
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtvk(φ(t)) dt,
and for any x ∈∏i∆([a0i , ak−1i ]) and y ∈∏i∆([ak−1i , a0i ]), let
Φk,−x = {φ ∈ Φ |φ(0) = x,
φ˙i(t) + φi(t) ∈ ∆([ak−1i , aki ]) ∀ i ∈ I, a.a. t ≥ 0},
Φk,+y = {φ ∈ Φ |φ(0) = y,
φ˙i(t) + φi(t) ∈ ∆([aki , ak−1i ]) ∀ i ∈ I, a.a. t ≥ 0}.
Consider the maximization problems:
max Jkθ (φ) s.t. φ ∈ Φk,−x , (4.3)
max Jkθ (φ) s.t. φ ∈ Φk,+y . (4.4)
Since Jkθ is continuous, and Φ
k,−
x and Φ
k,+
y are compact, the above maxi-
mization problems admit solutions.
Lemma 4.3. (1) For each k = 1, . . . ,m, and for any θ > 0 and any
x ∈ ∏i∆([a0i , aki ]) and y ∈ ∏i∆([aki , a0i ]): there exists a solution to the
maximization problem (4.3), φk,−, such that
φ˙k,−i (t) = minBR
i
vk(φ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(t)− φk,−i (t) (4.5)
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for all i ∈ I and almost all t ≥ 0; there exists a solution to the maximization
problem (4.4), φk,+, such that
φ˙k,+i (t) = minBR
i
vk(φ
k,+
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(t)− φk,+i (t) (4.6)
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ≥ 0.
(2) For each k = 1, . . . ,m, there exists θ¯k > 0 such that for any θ ∈
(0, θ¯k) and any x ∈ ∏i∆([a0i , aki ]) (y ∈ ∏i∆([aki , a0i ]), resp.), any solution
to the maximization problem (4.3) ( (4.4), resp.) converges to ak (ak, resp.).
Proof. (1) We only show the existence of a solution that satisfies (4.5) (the
existence of a solution that satisfies (4.6) is proved similarly). First note
that for each i ∈ I,
(1 + θ)e−θtvk(φ(t)) =
∑
h∈Ai
etφih(t)
d
dt
(
−e−(1+θ)tV kih(φ−i)(t)
)
=
d
dt
(
−e−θt
∑
h∈Ai
φih(t)V kih(φ−i)(t)
)
+ e−θt
∑
h∈Ai
(
φ˙ih(t) + φih(t)
)
V kih(φ−i)(t)
for almost all t ≥ 0, where
V kih(φ−i)(t) = (1 + θ)
∫ ∞
t
e−(1+θ)(s−t)vk(h, φ−i(s)) ds.
Therefore, any solution to (4.3), φk, satisfies
φ˙kih(t) > −φkih ⇒ h ∈ BRivk(φk−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) (4.7)
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ≥ 0. It then follows from Lemma A.1.3 in
OTH (2008) that there exists a feasible path φk,−i that satisfies (4.5).
(2) We show that there exists θ¯k > 0 such that for any θ ∈ (0, θ¯k), any
solution to (4.3) ((4.4), resp.) approaches arbitrarily close to ak (ak, resp.).
Here, θ¯k can be taken independently of x and y. Then, by following the
proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 in HS (1999) (see also Theorem 4.1 in HS (2002))
for the potential game v|[a0,ak], one can show that once any feasible path
that satisfies (4.7) gets close enough to the potential maximizer ak, it must
converge to ak. A dual argument applies to solutions to (4.4)
Let vkmax = v
k(ak) = vk(ak), vk = maxa∈A\[ak,ak] v
k(a), and vk =
mina∈A vk(a). Note that vkmax > vk ≥ vk. Let φ be any solution to
(4.3), and ψ the linear path from x to ak: i.e., for all i ∈ I and t ≥ 0,
ψih(t) = 1 − (1 − xih)e−t if h = aki and ψih(t) = xihe−t otherwise. Denote
φ(a|t) =∏i∈I φiai(t) and ψ(a|t) =∏i∈I ψiai(t). We first have
Jkθ (φ) ≥ Jkθ (ψ)
=
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtψ(ak|t) dt vkmax +
∑
a 6=ak
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtψ(a|t) dt vk(a)
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≥
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtψ(ak|t) dt vkmax +
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtψ(ak|t) dt
]
vk
= vkmax −
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
θe−θt
∏
i∈I
{
1−
(
1− xiaki
)
e−t
}
dt
](
vkmax − vk
)
≥ vkmax −
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
θe−θt
(
1− e−t)N dt](vkmax − vk) .
We also have
Jkθ (φ) =
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtφ(ak|t) dt vkmax +
∑
a 6=ak
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtφ(a|t) dt vk(a)
≤
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtφ(ak|t) dt vkmax +
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
θe−θtφ(ak|t) dt
]
vk.
Combining these inequalities, we have∫ ∞
0
θe−θtφ(ak|t) dt ≥ 1− v
k
max − vk
vkmax − vk
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
θe−θt
(
1− e−t)N dt] .
The integral in the right hand side converges to one as θ goes to zero.
Therefore, given δ > 0 we have θk > 0 such that for all θ ∈ (0, θk),∫ ∞
0
θe−θtφ(ak|t) dt ≥ 1− δ,
which implies that there exists t ≥ 0 such that φ(ak|t) ≥ 1 − δ, and hence,
φiaki
(t) ≥ 1− δ for all i ∈ I.
In the following, we set T 0 = 0, and φ0,− and φ0,+ to be such that
φ0,−(t) = a0 and φ0,+(t) = a0 for all t ≥ 0, respectively.
Lemma 4.4. There exists θ¯ > 0 such that for any θ ∈ (0, θ¯), there exist
T 1, . . . , Tm−1 with T 1 ≤ · · · ≤ Tm−1 <∞ and feasible paths φ1,−, . . . , φm,−
and φ1,+, . . . , φm,+ such that for each k = 1, . . . ,m,
(∗−k ) φk,−(t) = φk−1,−(t) for all t ∈ [0, T k−1], φk,−(T k−1) ∈ Bη(ak−1),
φ˙k,−i (t) = minBR
i
vk(φ
k,−
−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(t)− φk,−i (t)
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ∈ [T k−1,∞), and limt→∞ φk,−(t) = ak,
and
(∗+k ) φk,+(t) = φk−1,+(t) for all t ∈ [0, T k−1], φk,+(T k−1) ∈ Bη(ak−1),
φ˙k,+i (t) = maxBR
i
vk(φ
k,+
−i |[aki , ak−1i ])(t)− φk,+i (t)
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ∈ [T k−1,∞), and limt→∞ φk,+(t) = ak.
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Proof. Take θ¯1, . . . , θ¯m as in Lemma 4.3, and set θ¯ = min{θ¯1, . . . , θ¯m}. Fix
any θ ∈ (0, θ¯). First, by Lemma 4.3 for (4.3) and (4.4) with k = 1, x = a0,
and y = a0, we have feasible paths φ1,− and φ1,+ that satisfy (∗−1 ) and (∗+1 ),
respectively.
Next, for k ≥ 2 assume that there exist T 0, . . . , T k−2, φ1,−, . . . , φk−1,−,
and φ1,+, . . . , φk−1,+ that satisfy (∗−1 ), . . . , (∗−k−1) and (∗+1 ), . . . , (∗+k−1). Let
T k−1 ≥ T k−2 be such that φk−1,−(t) ∈ Bη(ak−1) and φk−1,+(t) ∈ Bη(ak−1)
for all t ≥ T k−1. Then, consider the maximization problems:
max Jkθ (φ) s.t. φ ∈ Φk,−Tk−1 , (4.8)
max Jkθ (φ) s.t. φ ∈ Φk,+Tk−1 , (4.9)
where
Φk,−
Tk−1 = {φ ∈ Φ |φ(t) = φk−1,−(t) ∀ t ∈ [0, T k−1],
φ˙i(t) + φi(t) ∈ ∆([ak−1i , aki ]) ∀ i ∈ I, a.a. t ∈ [T k−1,∞)},
Φk,+
Tk−1 = {φ ∈ Φ |φ(t) = φk−1,+(t) ∀ t ∈ [0, T k−1],
φ˙i(t) + φi(t) ∈ ∆([aki , ak−1i ]) ∀ i ∈ I, a.a. t ∈ [T k−1,∞)}.
Observe that (4.8) and (4.9) are equivalent to (4.3) with x = φk−1,−(T k−1)
and (4.4) with y = φk−1,+(T k−1), respectively. Therefore, by Lemma 4.3 we
have feasible paths φk,− and φk,+ that satisfy (∗−k ) and (∗+k ), respectively.
Let Tm =∞.
Lemma 4.5. There exists θ¯ > 0 such that for any θ ∈ (0, θ¯), there exist
T 1, . . . , Tm−1 with T 1 ≤ · · · < Tm−1 ≤ ∞ and feasible paths φ− and φ+
such that
(∗−) φ−(0) = a0, limt→∞ φ−(t) = a∗, and for each k = 1, . . . ,m, φ−(t) ∈
Bη([ak−1, a∗]) for all t ∈ [T k−1,∞) and
φ˙−i (t) = minBR
i
vk(φ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)− φ−i (t)
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ∈ [T k−1, T k),
and
(∗+) φ+(0) = a0, limt→∞ φ+(t) = a∗, and for each k = 1, . . . ,m, φ+(t) ∈
Bη([a∗, ak−1]) for all t ∈ [T k−1,∞) and
φ˙+i (t) = maxBR
i
vk(φ
+
−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t)− φ+i (t)
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ∈ [T k−1, T k).
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Proof. Take θ¯ as in Lemma 4.4. Fix any θ ∈ (0, θ¯), and let φ1,−, . . . , φm,−,
and φ1,+, . . . , φm,+ satisfy (∗−k ) and (∗+k ) for k = 1, . . . ,m, respectively. Set
φ− = φm,− and φ+ = φm,+. We only verify that φ− satisfies (∗−).
For each k = 1, . . . ,m, we have φ−i (t) ∈ Bη([ak−1i , a∗i ]) for all i ∈ I and
all t ≥ T k−1. We also have limt→∞ φ−(t) = a∗. Observe that T k’s can
be taken sufficiently large so that for each k = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and i ∈ I,
φ−ih(t) = φ
k,−
ih (t) = e
−(t−Tk)φk,−ih (T
k) for all h /∈ [aki , a∗i ] and all t ≥ T k. Note
that by construction, φ−(t) = φk,−(t) for all t ≤ T k. Since vk(a) = vk(a′)
for all a, a′ ∈ [ak, ak], it follows that for each k = 1, . . . ,m − 1 and i ∈ I,
BRivk(φ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) = BRivk(φk,−−i |[ak−1i , aki ])(t) for all t ≤ T k.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose that vk’s are monotone potential functions
for a∗ relative toBη([ak−1, ak−1]). Take θ¯ as in Lemma 4.5. Fix any θ ∈ (0, θ¯)
and let φ− and φ+ satisfy (∗−) and (∗+), respectively.
Fix any x ∈ ∏i∆(Ai). Let βx be the best response correspondence
defined in (4.2). Let Φ˜x = {φ ∈ Φx |φ− - φ - φ+}. We will show that
β˜x(φ) = βx(φ) ∩ Φ˜x is nonempty for any φ ∈ Φ˜x. Then, since Φ˜x is convex
and compact, it follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem that there
exists a fixed point φ∗ ∈ β˜x(φ∗) ⊂ Φ˜x, which is a perfect foresight path in g
and satisfies φ− - φ∗ - φ+. Since both φ− and φ+ converge to a∗, φ∗ also
converges to a∗.
Take any φ ∈ Φ˜x. Consider any k = 1, . . . ,m. Note that φ(t) ∈
Bη([ak−1, ak−1]) for all t ≥ T k−1.
Suppose first that gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i are supermodular for all i ∈ I. Then,
for all i ∈ I,
minBRivk(φ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) ≤ maxBRigi(φ−−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)
≤ maxBRigi(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)
for all t ∈ [T k−1, T k), where the second inequality follows from
the assumption that vk is a monotone potential function relative to
Bη([ak−1, ak−1]), and the third inequality follows from the supermodular-
ity of gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i . Similarly, for all i ∈ I,
maxBRivk(φ
+
−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t) ≥ minBRigi(φ+−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t)
≥ minBRigi(φ−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t)
for all t ∈ [T k−1, T k).
Suppose next that vk|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i are supermodular for all i ∈ I.
Then, for all i ∈ I,
minBRivk(φ
−
−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) ≤ minBRivk(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)
≤ maxBRigi(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)
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for all t ∈ [T k−1, T k), where the second inequality follows from the su-
permodularity of vk|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i , and the third inequality follows from
the assumption that vk is a monotone potential function relative to
Bη([ak−1, ak−1]). Similarly, for all i ∈ I,
maxBRivk(φ
+
−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t) ≥ maxBRivk(φ−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t)
≥ minBRigi(φ−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t)
for all t ∈ [T k−1, T k).
Therefore, in each case, we have for all t ∈ [T k−1, T k),
maxBRigi(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) ≥ minBRivk(φ−−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t),
minBRigi(φ−i|aki , ak−1i ])(t) ≤ maxBRivk(φ+−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t).
Since φ(t) ∈ Bη(∆([ak−1, ak−1])) for all t ≥ T k−1 and hence
BRigi(φ−i)(t) ∩ [ak−1i , ak−1i ] 6= ∅
by the choice of η, it follows that
BRigi(φ−i)(t)
∩ [minBRivk(φ−−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t),maxBRivk(φ+−i|[aki , ak−1i ])(t)] 6= ∅,
Let F˜i(φ−i)(t) be the convex hull of the above set. Then the differential
inclusion
ψ˙(t) ∈ F˜ (φ)(t)− ψ(t), ψ(0) = x
has a solution ψ (see OTH (2008, Remark 2.1)). Since F˜i(φ−i)(t) ⊂
Fi(φ−i)(t) = {αi ∈ ∆(Ai) |αih > 0 ⇒ h ∈ BRigi(φ−i)(t)}, we have
ψ ∈ βx(φ). By the construction of φ−, φ+, and ψ, we have φ− - ψ - φ+.
Thus, we have ψ ∈ β˜x(φ) = βx(φ) ∩ Φ˜x, implying the nonemptiness of
β˜x(φ).
By Proposition 2.5, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 4.6. If a∗ is an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium of g with∑
i∈I pi < 1, then there exists θ¯ > 0 such that a
∗ is globally accessible in g
for all θ ∈ (0, θ¯).
4.3 Linear Absorption of Iterated Strict MP-Maximizer
In this subsection, we prove that under the same monotonicity condition
as in the informational robustness and the global accessibility results, an
iterated strict MP-maximizer is linearly absorbing (regardless of the degree
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of friction), and therefore, it is the unique equilibrium that is globally ac-
cessible and linearly absorbing for any small degree of friction.12
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that g has an iterated strict MP-maximizer a∗ with
associated intervals (Sk)mk=0 and strict monotone potential functions (v
k)mk=1.
If for each k = 1, . . . ,m, gi|Sk−1i ×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I or v
k|Sk−1
is supermodular, then a∗ is linearly absorbing in g for all θ > 0.
We will use the following result due to Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) and
OTH (2008).
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that v|S is a potential game with a unique potential
maximizer a∗ ∈ S. Then, a∗ is absorbing in v|S for all θ > 0. If in addition,
v|S is supermodular, then a∗ is linearly absorbing in v|S for all θ > 0.
Suppose that a∗ is an iterated strict MP-maximizer of g with associated
intervals (Sk)mk=0 and strict monotone potential functions (v
k)mk=1. Due to
Lemma 2.2, we can have (v˜k)mk=1 and η > 0 such that for each k = 1, . . . ,m,
v˜k : A→ R is a strict monotone potential function relative to Bη(∆(Sk−1)).
For each k = 0, 1, . . . ,m and i ∈ I, write Ski = [aki , aki ], where 0 = a0i ≤ a1i ≤
· · · ≤ ami = a∗i = ami ≤ · · · ≤ a1i ≤ a0i = ni. In defining such (v˜k)mk=1 and
η > 0, we extend vk (k = 1, . . . ,m) to A so that [ak−1, ak] and [ak, ak−1] are
strict best response sets in the games v˜k|[a0,ak] and v˜k|[ak,a0], respectively,
and take η > 0 to be sufficiently small so that for all k = 1, . . . ,m and all
i ∈ I,
br iv˜k(pii|[a0i , aki ]) ⊂ [ak−1i , aki ]
for all pii ∈ Bη(∆([ak−1−i , ak−i])) and
br iv˜k(pii|[aki , a0i ]) ⊂ [[aki , ak−1i ]
for all pii ∈ Bη(∆([ak−i, ak−1−i ])). In the case where vk|[ak−1,ak−1] is super-
modular, vk is extended so that v˜k|[a0,ak] and v˜k|[ak,a0] are supermodular.
We assume without loss of generality that in each potential game v˜k|[a0,ak]
(v˜k|[ak,a0], resp.), any perfect foresight path from Bη(ak) (Bη(ak), resp.)
converges (linearly, in the case where the game is also supermodular) to ak
(ak, resp.).
For an interval S ⊂ A, we say that a feasible path φ is an S-perfect
foresight path if for all i ∈ I, all h ∈ Ai, and almost all t ≥ 0,
φ˙ih(t) > −φih(t)⇒ h ∈ BRigi(φ−i|Si)(t). (4.10)
Note that if φ is an S-perfect foresight path with φ(0) = x, then for all
i ∈ Ai and all h /∈ Si, φih(t) = xihe−t for all t ≥ 0.
12Because of the supermodularity conditions, it can be shown that the same stability
properties in fact hold under rationalizable foresight (Matsui and Oyama (2006)); see
OTH (2008, Subsection 3.3).
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Lemma 4.9. For each k = 1, . . . ,m, if gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i is supermodular
for all i ∈ I or v˜k|[a0,ak] and v˜k|[ak,a0] are supermodular, then (1) for any
[ak−1, ak−1]-perfect foresight path φ∗ with φ∗(0) ∈ Bη(∆([ak, ak])),
lim
t→∞
∑
h∈[aki ,aki ]
φ∗ih(t) = 1 (4.11)
for all i ∈ I, and (2) there exists ηk ∈ (0, η] such that for any [ak−1, ak−1]-
perfect foresight path φ∗ with φ∗(0) ∈ Bηk(∆([ak, ak])),
BRigi(φ
∗
−i|[ak−1i , ak−1i ])(t) ⊂ [aki , aki ] (4.12)
for all i ∈ I and t ≥ 0.
Proof. (1) Take any x ∈ Bη(∆([ak, ak])) and any [ak−1, ak−1]-perfect fore-
sight path φ∗ with φ∗(0) = x. Note that φ∗(t) ∈ Bη(∆([ak−1, ak−1])) for all
t ≥ 0. Let
xk,−i = ηa
0
i + (1− η)aki , xk,+i = ηa0i + (1− η)aki ,
and denote xk,− =
(
xk,−i
)
i∈I and x
k,+ =
(
xk,+i
)
i∈I . We will find perfect
foresight paths φk,− and φk,+ for v˜k|[a0,ak] and v˜k|[ak,a0], respectively, such
that φk,−(0) = xk,−, φk,+(0) = xk,+, and φk,−(t) - φ∗(t) - φk,+(t) for all
t ≥ 0. Then, since the potential maximizer ak (ak, resp.) is absorbing in
v˜k|[a0,ak] (v˜k|[ak,a0], resp.), and hence φk,− (φk,+, resp.) converges to ak (ak,
resp.), φ∗ must satisfy (4.11).
The argument below follows that in OTH (2008, Appendix A.3). We
show the existence of φk,−; the existence of φk,+ can be shown similarly. Let
Φ˜xk,− be the set of feasible paths φ ∈ Φxk,− such that for all i ∈ I and all t ≥
0, φi(t) ∈ ∆([a0i , aki ]), φi(t) - φ∗i (t), and φih(t) = xk,−ih e−t for all h < ak−1i .
Consider the best response correspondence β−
v˜k
for the stage game v˜k|[a0,ak].
We will show that β˜−
v˜k
(φ) = β−
v˜k
(φ) ∩ Φ˜xk,− is nonempty for any φ ∈ Φ˜x−ε .
Then, since Φ˜xk,− is convex and compact, it follows from Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem that there exists a fixed point φk,− ∈ β˜−
v˜k
(φk,−) ⊂ Φ˜xk,− , as
desired.
Take any φ ∈ Φ˜xk,− . Note that φ(t) ∈ Bη(∆([ak−1, ak])) for all t ≥ 0,
and therefore BRiv˜k(φ−i|[a0i , aki ])(t) = BRiv˜k(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) by the choice
of η. In the case where gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I, we
have, for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ 0,
minBRiv˜k(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) ≤ minBRigi(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)
≤ minBRigi(φ∗−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t),
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that v˜k is a strict
monotone potential relative toBη(∆([ak−1, ak−1])) and the second inequality
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follows from the supermodularity of gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i . In the case where v
k
is supermodular, we have, for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ 0,
minBRiv˜k(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t) ≤ minBRiv˜k(φ−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t)
≤ minBRigi(φ∗−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t),
where the first inequality follows from the supermodularity of v˜k|[a0,ak] and
the second inequality follows from the assumption that v˜k is a strict mono-
tone potential relative to Bη(∆([ak−1, ak−1])). Therefore, in each case, we
have, for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ 0,
minBRiv˜k(φ−i|[a0i , aki ])(t) ≤ minBRigi(φ∗−i|[ak−1i , aki ])(t).
It follows that the solution ψ to
ψ˙i(t) = minBRiv˜k(φ−i|[a0i , aki ])(t)− ψi(t), ψ(0) = xk,−i ,
which is a best response to φ in the game v˜k|[a0,ak], satisfies ψ ∈ Φ˜xk,− . This
implies the nonemptiness of β˜−
v˜k
(φ).
(2) If gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I, then arguments
analogous to those in OTH (2008, Appendix A.1) show that (1) implies (2).
If v˜k|[a0,ak] and v˜k|[ak,a0] are supermodular, then ak (ak, resp.) is linearly
absorbing in v˜k|[a0,ak] (v˜k|[ak,a0], resp.) and hence φk,− (φk,+, resp.) con-
verges linearly to ak (ak, resp.). Therefore, for all i and all h /∈ [aki , aki ],
φ∗(t) = xihe−t for all t ≥ 0. Since [ak, ak] is a strict best response set in g,
it follows that φ∗ must satisfy (4.12).
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Suppose that v˜k’s are strict monotone potential func-
tions relative to Bη(∆([ak−1, ak−1])) and that for each k = 1, . . . ,m,
gi|[ak−1i ,ak−1i ]×A−i is supermodular for all i ∈ I or v˜
k|[a0,ak] and v˜k|[ak,a0]
are supermodular. Take η1, . . . , ηm as in Lemma 4.9, and let ε =
min{η1, . . . , ηm}.
Fix any x ∈ Bε(a∗) and any perfect foresight path φ∗ in g with φ∗(0) = x.
It is sufficient to prove that for all k = 1, . . . ,m,
BRigi(φ
∗
−i|[ak−1i , ak−1i ])(t) ⊂ [aki , aki ] (∗k)
holds for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ 0, which can be done by applying Lemma 4.9
iteratively. Indeed, since φ∗ is an [a0, a0]-perfect foresight path, (∗1) is true
by Lemma 4.9. If (∗1)–(∗k−1) are true, then φ∗ is an [ak−1, ak−1]-perfect
foresight path, so that (∗k) is also true by Lemma 4.9.
By Proposition 2.5, we immediately have the following.
Corollary 4.10. If a∗ is an iterated strict p-dominant equilibrium of g with∑
i∈I pi < 1, then a
∗ is linearly absorbing in g for all θ > 0.
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5 Conclusion
For any given set-valued solution concept, in principle, it is possible to con-
sider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. In this paper,
we applied such an iterative construction to two refinements of Nash equi-
librium: p-dominant equilibrium (Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) and Kajii
and Morris (1997)) or p-best response set (Tercieux (2006a)); and potential
maximizer (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) or MP-maximizer (Morris and
Ui (2005)). We showed that the iterative construction preserves their robust-
ness to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris (1997)) as well as stability
under perfect foresight dynamics (Matsui and Matsuyama (1995)): iterated
p-dominant equilibria as well as iterated MP-maximizers (under some mono-
tonicity conditions) are both robust to incomplete information and globally
accessible (for a small degree of friction) and linearly absorbing under perfect
foresight dynamics. We also proposed simple procedures, for some special
classes of games, to find an iterated p-dominant equilibrium or an iterated
MP-maximizer. In particular, we introduced iterated pairwise p-dominance
and iterated risk-dominance for general supermodular games and two-player
supermodular coordination games, respectively. An iterated MP-maximizer
is shown to exist and to be easy to find in an economically relevant class
of games. However, generally, finding an MP-maximizer or iterated MP-
maximizer is a difficult task. We see these simpler procedures as natural
first steps to check whether our main theorems apply.
We provided numerical examples to assess the relevance of the iterative
construction for both the p-dominance and the potential maximization ap-
proaches. In particular, the example in Subsection 2.6 shows, first, that
for the p-dominance approach, our iterative construction leads to a strictly
more general concept. In this example, the game has no (p1, p2)-dominant
equilibrium such that p1+ p2 < 1, but has an iterated strict (p, p)-dominant
equilibrium for some p < 1/2 and hence our results show that it is robust
to incomplete information and stable under perfect foresight dynamics. The
same example also shows that, for LP-maximizers, iteration has a bite in
the potential approach as well. For this specific form of MP-maximizers, we
could exploit an existing characterization that is rather easy to manipulate
in verifying that the game has no LP-maximizer while having an iterated
LP-maximizer. Note, by contrast, that no such characterization has been
known for MP-maximizers. This fact makes it difficult to examine the addi-
tional bite of iterated MP-maximizer over MP-maximizer. Identifying a full
characterization, in particular a (tight) necessary condition, for a game to
have an MP-maximizer or an iterated MP-maximizer is left an open problem
for future research.
Finally, we considered a simple application of our concepts in a context
of technology adoption, to demonstrate that our iterative procedure can be
used in identifying a robust prediction in an economic situation. Given that
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potential maximization methods are found in various fields in economics,
such as industrial organization (Slade (1994), Monderer and Shapley (1996)),
mechanism design and implementation (Sandholm (2007), Bergemann and
Morris (2008)) and economic geography (Oyama (2006)), as well as in trans-
portation science (Beckmann et al. (1956), Rosenthal (1973)), it is hoped
that the theory developed in this paper will be of use also in other applica-
tions than the simple one discussed here.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Let S∗, S ⊂ A, and v : S → R be as in the statement. For i ∈ I and ai ∈ Ai,
let
Π−iai(gi) = {pii ∈ ∆(A−i) | min br igi(pii|[minSi,maxS∗i ]) ≤ ai},
Π+iai(gi) = {pii ∈ ∆(A−i) | max br igi(pii|[minS∗i ,maxSi]) ≥ ai};
and for f ∈ RA,
Π̂−iai(f) = {pii ∈ ∆(A−i) | min br if (pii|[minSi,minS∗i ]) ≤ ai},
Π̂+iai(f) = {pii ∈ ∆(A−i) | max br if (pii|[maxS∗i ,maxSi]) ≥ ai}.
Observe that Π−iai(gi) and Π̂
−
iai
(f) (Π+iai(gi) and Π̂
+
iai
(f), resp.) are closed
(in ∆(A−i)) due to the lower (upper, resp.) semi-continuity of min br igi and
min br if (max br
i
gi and max br
i
f , resp.). Note that these sets may be empty.
Here we give a characterization of strict MP-maximizer in terms of these
sets.
Lemma A.1.1. S∗ is a strict MP-maximizer set of g|S with a strict mono-
tone potential function v if and only if S∗ = argmaxa∈S v(a), and for all
i ∈ I,
Π−iai(gi) ∩∆(S−i) ⊂ Π̂−iai(v) ∩∆(S−i)
for all ai ∈ [minSi,minS∗i ] and
Π+iai(gi) ∩∆(S−i) ⊂ Π̂+iai(v) ∩∆(S−i)
for all ai ∈ [maxS∗i ,maxSi].
Now, extend v arbitrarily to A (i.e., consider a function defined on A
that coincides with v on S, and denote it again by v) satisfying S∗ =
argmaxa∈S v(a). In the case where v is supermodular, extend v so that
v|A is supermodular.
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For γ > 0, define cγ : A→ R by
cγ(a) = γ
∑
i∈I
|ai − S∗i |,
where
|ai − S∗i | =

0 if ai ∈ S∗i ,
minS∗i − ai if ai < minS∗i ,
ai −maxS∗i if ai > maxS∗i .
Observe that if h < k ≤ minS∗i or h > k ≥ maxS∗i , then for all a−i ∈ A−i,
cγ(k, a−i)− cγ(h, a−i) = −|k − h|γ ≤ −γ.
Fix any γ > 0 such that γ <
(
maxa∈A v(a) − maxa/∈S∗ v(a)
)
/
∑
i∈I ni.
Then define v˜ : A→ R by
v˜(a) = v(a) + cγ(a). (A.1)
By the choice of γ, S∗ = argmaxa∈A v˜(a). Verify also that if v|S is super-
modular, then so is v˜. The following lemma shows that the transformation
above expands Π̂−iai(v) and Π̂
+
iai
(v).
Lemma A.1.2. Given v : A → R, let v˜ : A → R be defined by (A.1). For
each i ∈ I and ai ∈ [minSi,minS∗i ], there exists an open set U−iai ⊂ ∆(A−i)
such that
Π̂−iai(v) ⊂ U−iai ⊂ Π̂−iai(v˜).
Similarly, for each i ∈ I and ai ∈ [maxS∗i ,maxSi], there exists an open set
U+iai ⊂ ∆(A−i) such that
Π̂+iai(v) ⊂ U+iai ⊂ Π̂+iai(v˜).
Proof. Fix i ∈ I and ai ∈ [minSi,minS∗i ]. Take any pii ∈ Π̂−iai(v): i.e.,
min br iv(pii|[minSi,minS∗i ]) ≤ ai. Take ε(pii) > 0 such that if pi′i ∈ Bε(pii)(pii),
then
max
h,k∈Ai
∣∣(v˜(k, pi′i)− v˜(h, pi′i))− (v˜(k, pii)− v˜(h, pii))∣∣ < γ.
Let us show that Bε(pii)(pii) ⊂ Π̂−iai(v˜). Take any pi′i ∈ Bε(pii)(pii), and let
ai = min br
i
v˜(pi
′
i|[minSi,minS∗i ]). We want to show that ai ≤ ai. It is
sufficient to show that ai ≤ min br iv(pii|[minSi,minS∗i ]). If h < ai, then
v(ai, pii)− v(h, pii) =
(
v˜(ai, pii)− cγ(ai, pii)
)− (v˜(h, pii)− cγ(h, pii))
= v˜(ai, pii)− v˜(h, pii) + (ai − h)γ
≥ v˜(ai, pii)− v˜(h, pii) + γ
> v˜(ai, pi
′
i)− v˜(h, pi′i) > 0.
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This means that ai ≤ min br iv(pii|[minSi,minS∗i ]), which implies that pi′i ∈
Π̂−iai(v˜).
Then set U−iai =
⋃
pii∈bΠ−iai (v)Bε(pii)(pii).
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Given v : A → R, let v˜ : A → R be defined by (A.1).
Then, S∗ = argmaxa∈A v˜(a); and if v|S is supermodular, then so is v˜. For
each i ∈ I and ai ∈ [minSi,minS∗i ] such that Π−iai(gi) 6= ∅, take an open set
U−iai as in Lemma A.1.2. Note that Π
−
iai
(gi) ∩∆(S−i) ⊂ U−iai . Since Π−iai(gi)
and ∆(S−i) are closed in a compact set ∆(A−i), there exists η−(i, ai) > 0
such that
Π−iai(gi) ∩Bη−(i,ai)(∆(S−i)) ⊂ U−iai .
Apply the same argument to each i ∈ I and a′i ∈ [maxS∗i ,maxSi] such that
Π+
ia′i
(gi) 6= ∅ to obtain η+(i, a′i) > 0 such that
Π+
ia′i
(gi) ∩Bη+(i,a′i)(∆(S−i)) ⊂ U
+
ia′i
,
where U+
ia′i
is as in Lemma A.1.2.
Finally, set η = mini,ai η
−(i, ai) ∧mini,a′i η+(i, a′i).
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